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Abstract
We prove consistency of intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory (MLTT) with formal
Church’s thesis (CT), which was open for at least fifteen years. The difficulty in
proving the consistency is that a standard method of realizability a` la Kleene does
not work for the consistency, though it validates CT, as it does not model MLTT;
specifically, the realizability does not validate MLTT’s congruence rule on pi-types
(known as the ξ-rule). We overcome this point and prove the consistency by novel
realizability a` la game semantics, which is based on the author’s previous work.
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Convention To clear ambiguity, we call a mere assignment of semantic objects to
syntactic objects an interpretation or semantics, and an interpretation that respects
target syntactic properties (e.g., existence of a derivation of equality between terms)
by semantic properties (e.g., agreement of the assigned semantic objects) a model.
(I.e., a model means a sound interpretation.) We say that an interpretation models
a type theory if it is a model of the type theory, and it models or validates (resp.
refutes) an axiom or rule if it respects (resp. does not respect) the axiom or rule.
1 Introduction
We prove consistency of intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory with formal Church’s
thesis, which was open for at least fifteen years. Our motivation comes from the view
that the consistency problem is interesting as a mathematical problem in its own
right but also from its consequences on foundations of constructive mathematics.
Intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory, or MLTT for short, is a formal system for
constructive mathematics, which is shown to be consistent (i.e., it does not derive
falsity). On the other hand, formal Church’s thesis is a logical formula expressible
in MLTT and states that (total) maps on the set N of all natural numbers are all
‘computable’ or recursive. Then, our result, i.e., the targeted consistency, means that
MLTT equipped with formal Church’s thesis as an additional axiom is consistent.
Our consistency proof is based on a mathematical model of MLTT, called game
semantics, and in a novel manner takes advantage of its distinguishing features: the
distinction and the asymmetry between Player, who ‘executes (the interpretation
of) a term,’ and Opponent, who plays the role of the ‘computational environment’
or ‘rebutter’ for Player. More precisely, our modified game semantics, which we
call realizability a` la game semantics, forces Opponent to play as ‘total,’ ‘effective’
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computation when he plays as an input for Player and moreover exhibit a realizer
for his input computation before its execution even if the calculation of the realizer
is not ‘effective,’[1] while in contrast it does not impose this heavy task on Player
or assign to her a choice of a realizer for the interpretation of a term. Consequently,
realizability a` la game semantics trivially validates formal Church’s thesis because
Opponent discloses a realizer for his input computation N → N (so that it suffices
for validating formal Church’s thesis to just let Player ‘copy-cat’ the realizer), but
also it models MLTT since it is as abstract as the existing game semantics of MLTT.
This novel game-semantic art explains why our method, unlike existing ones,
succeeds in solving the consistency problem, and moreover it opens up a new way
of applying game semantics to the study of constructive mathematics.
In the rest of this introduction, we explain the backgrounds, our motivations, the
problem to solve, our solution for the problem, our contribution and related work
in such a way that it would suffice in subsequent sections to just fill in the details.
1.1 Constructive mathematics
Constructive mathematics [2, 3, 4] is a branch of mathematical logic [5] and foun-
dations of mathematics [6] that studies ‘constructive,’ ‘computable’ or ‘effective’
objects and reasonings. One of the major motivations for constructive mathemat-
ics is the suspicion against ‘nonconstructive’ objects and reasonings in classical or
ordinary mathematics, e.g., the law of excluded middle and the axiom of choice [2].
However, constructive mathematicians have never established a universal consen-
sus on which objects and reasonings in mathematics are ‘constructive’ or how to
formulate the informal notion of ‘constructivity.’ In fact, various different schools
of constructive mathematics have arisen and been present in the literature.
1.2 Type theories
Type theories [7] are a particular class of formal systems [5], whose distinguishing
feature is that their variables and terms are always typed. By the Curry-Howard
isomorphisms (CHIs) [8], type theories serve as a single formalism for both logic
and computation; they are not only formal systems but also programming languages.
A type theory is simple if it prohibits variables from occurring in types, and it
is dependent otherwise [7, 8], where we consider only term variables (i.e., no type
variables) in this article. The generalization of simple type theories to dependent
ones corresponds under the CHIs to that of propositional logic to predicate logic [5].
Type theories are similar to sequent calculi [9, 10] except that vertices of a formal
proof or derivation (tree) in a type theory are not sequents but judgements, for
which we usually write J (possibly with subscripts/superscripts). Hence, a type
theory consists of axioms J and (inference) rules
J1 J2...Jk
J0
, which are to make
a conclusion from hypotheses by constructing a derivation. Most type theories have
the following six kinds of judgements (followed by their intended meanings):
1 ⊢ Γ ctx (Γ is a context, i.e., a finite sequence of pairs of a variable and a type);
2 Γ ⊢ A type (A is a type in the context Γ);
3 Γ ⊢ a : A (a is a term of the type A in the context Γ);
[1]It is not a problem because game semantics treats Opponent as an ‘oracle’ endowed
with an unlimited computational power. See [1, Section 1] for more on this point.
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4 ⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx (Γ and ∆ are equal contexts);
5 Γ ⊢ A = B type (A and B are equal types in the context Γ);
6 Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A (a and a′ are equal terms of the type A in the context Γ),
where the judgements (1), (4) and (5) are trivial and usually omitted in simple type
theories. We often omit the turnstile ⊢ in judgements if the context on the LHS is
empty. The CHIs regard contexts, types and terms as assumptions, formulas and
proofs in logic, respectively; type theories serve as formal systems in this way [8].
1.3 Intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory
Martin-Lo¨f type theory (MLTT) invented by Martin-Lo¨f [11, 12, 13] is a prominent
dependent type theory meant to be a foundation of constructive mathematics, which
is comparable to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC) [14]
for classical mathematics. Also, MLTT is a subject in computer science as well since
it is not only a formal system but also a programming language [15].
Strictly speaking, there are the intensional and the extensional variants of MLTT;
see Appendix A for the details. In this article, we focus on the intensional variant
as the extensional one is known to be inconsistent with formal Church’s thesis [16,
Proposition 6.2], and MLTT refers to the intensional one unless stated otherwise.
By its computational nature, more specifically operational semantics, of MLTT,
one may prove consistency of MLTT, i.e., there is no formal proof of the empty-type
(i.e., the type or formula of falsity) in MLTT; e.g., see [17, Corollary A.4.6].
For the rest of this article, let us assume that the reader is familiar with MLTT,
especially its syntax, and leave the details to Appendix A or the references [13, 18].
1.4 Formal Church’s thesis
(Formal) Church’s thesis (CT) [19] is a logical formula that is expressible in MLTT
and argued mostly in the context of constructive mathematics. Informally, CT states
that every (total) function on N is recursive (i.e., ‘effective’ in the standard mathe-
matical sense [20]). In other words, CT represents the particular school of construc-
tive mathematics that requires every mathematical object to be ‘constructive.’
Remark The name of CT comes from that of Church-Turing thesis (CTT) [20],
which states that ‘computable’ (in the informal sense) partial functions on N are
precisely recursive ones. Note, however, that CT and CTT are different statements.
In contrast with CT, some of the other schools in constructive mathematics such
as computable analysis [21] accept constructions or operations on ‘nonconstructive’
objects such as non-recursive functions and real numbers. Also, CT contradicts the
classical recursion theory [20] because the latter shows that there are non-recursive
functions on N such as the one for the halting problem.
At this point, let us recall a standard formalization of CT as a logical formula,
∀f ∈ N⇒ N, ∃e ∈ N, ∀n ∈ N, ∃c ∈ N. T (e, n, c) ∧ U(c) = f(n) [2, p. 192], (1)
where T represents Kleene’s T-predicate, and U does the result-extracting function
[2, p. 133]. Recall that T (e, n, c) holds if and only if c encodes the computational
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history of the (necessarily terminating[2]) computation encoded by e applied to the
input n, and U(c) is the output of the computational process encoded by c, where an
encoding of algorithms by natural numbers is arbitrarily fixed. Because a function
f : N → N is recursive if and only if there is a natural number e ∈ N that encodes
an algorithm for f [20], the formula (1) indeed formalizes the intended meaning of
CT. Following a convention in the field of realizability [2, Section 4.4.1], we call such
a natural number e a realizer for f , and equivalently say that e realizes f .
The standard constructive reading or the BHK-interpretation of intuitionistic
logic [2] interprets CT (1) as: There is an algorithm to compute a realizer e ∈ N for
a given function f : N → N, where note that it is trivial to constructively validate
the remaining part ∀n ∈ N, ∃c ∈ N. T (e, n, c) ∧ U(c) = f(n) once a realizer e for
f is obtained. However, it is in general not ‘effective’ to compute a realizer for a
given function N→ N, even if the function is recursive, since otherwise equality on
recursive functions N → N would be decidable, contradicting Rice’s theorem [22].
Thus, a constructive model of CT must require the inputs N → N not only to be
recursive but also to exhibit their realizers. We shall come back to this point shortly.
Finally, let us translate under the CHIs the formula (1) into a formula in MLTT,
Πf:N⇒NΣe:NΠn:NΣc:NT(e, n, c)× IdN(U(c), f(n)), (2)
where the type e : N, n : N, c : N ⊢ T(e, n, c) type represents the T-predicate, and the
term c : N ⊢ U(c) : N does the result-extracting function. Note that they are both
primitive recursive [2, Section 3.4.3] and so expressible as formulas of MLTT.
1.5 Our goal: to prove consistency of intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory with formal
Church’s thesis
Although CT has been shown to be consistent with most intuitionistic formalisms
in the literature [2, Section 4.10.2], MLTT is an exception: Consistency of MLTT
with CT (2) was an open problem (until the present work has solved it) though both
MLTT and CT were introduced in the 1970s. In other words, it had been unknown
whether or not MLTT is compatible with the view that every function N → N is
‘constructive.’ Let us add another historical fact that this consistency problem was
articulated explicitly fifteen years ago by Maietti and Sambin [16, Section 6.4].
The primary goal of the present work is to solve this long-standing open problem
in the affirmative. Our motivation is mathematical ; that is, we find the consistency
problem as technically challenging yet interesting in its own right, which we explain
below. We are also motivated by the fact that the consistency, if established, would
have consequences on foundations of constructive mathematics; for instance, MLTT
plus CT would be available as an intensional level foundation for the programme
of a minimalist two-level foundation for constructive mathematics [23].
1.6 Why is the consistency difficult to prove?
As its longevity indicates, the consistency problem poses a technical challenge.
Specifically, the challenge is that a standard method of realizability a` la Kleene
[2] for showing consistency of an intuitionistic formal system with CT does not
[2]The computation must be terminating since its computational history is finite.
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work for the case of MLTT [24].[3] Concretely, the obstacle is that the realizability
does not model MLTT, though it validates CT, since it does not validate MLTT’s
congruence rule on pi-types, known as the ξ-rule:
Γ, x : A ⊢ b = b′ : B
(ξ)
Γ ⊢ λxA.b = λxA.b′ : Πx:AB
The point is that the realizability interprets a term in MLTT by a choice of its
realizer, i.e., a natural number that encodes an algorithm for the term, and inputs
of a term, if any,[4] by their realizers too. This highly intensional interpretation
constructively (in the sense explained in Section 1.4) yet trivially validates CT since
the inputs N→ N already come in the form of realizers. However, this interpretation
of open terms, i.e., terms whose contexts are nonempty, does not validate equality
between open terms such as x : N ⊢ x = x+ 0 : N because the two terms represent
(trivially) different algorithms; thus, we must take the quotient of the interpretation
of each open term modulo input-output pairs or extensions. (N.b., in contrast, we
cannot take the quotients of closed terms of pi-types unless we give up validating
CT.) But the quotient makes the interpretation of an open term more extensional
than that of its λ-abstraction; hence, the interpretation refutes the ξ-rule. For a
detailed account of this problem, see Ishihara et al. [24].
On the other hand, another standard realizability a` la assemblies [25, 26] models
MLTT, including the ξ-rule, since unlike the one a` la Kleene it does not assign
realizers as part of its interpretation of terms, i.e., the one a` la assemblies is more
extensional than the one a` la Kleene. But still, the former requires existence of a
realizer for the interpretation of a term, and thus it reads CT (2) constructively. It
also requires existence of realizers for inputs of the interpretation of a term, if any,
but again it does not assign a choice of these realizers. Consequently, realizability
a` la assemblies does not validate CT since the inputs N → N in the interpretation
are just recursive functions N → N, and so there is no algorithm to calculate their
realizers as remarked in Section 1.4 (but the realizability reads CT constructively).
Remark If we assign a choice of realizers only to inputs of the interpretation of an
open term and not to the interpretation itself in realizability a` la assemblies then
the interpretation would refute the ξ-rule just like realizability a` la Kleene does.
To summarize, the main difficulty of the consistency problem is that the standard
consistency proof of constructing a realizability model of MLTT plus CT suffers from
the dilemma between intensionality and extensionality: An interpretation must be
intensional enough to validate CT but also extensional enough to model open terms.
We conquer this challenge by introducing novel realizability a` la game semantics.
1.7 Game semantics of simple type theories
Game semantics [27, 28] refers to a particular class of denotational (mathematical)
semantics of logic and computation [29] that interprets formulas (or types) and
[3]Also, it is unclear how to extend the syntactic method for proving consistency of
MLTT mentioned in Section 1.3 to MLTT plus CT.
[4]A term has inputs precisely when it is open or of a pi-type.
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proofs (or terms) as games and strategies, respectively. Game semantics has been
highly successful in interpreting a wide range of simple type theories [30, 31] and
moreover extended to dependent type theories just recently [32, 33].
A distinguishing feature of game semantics is that it models logic and computation
in terms of interactions between two participants of games, Player, who plays by
following a strategy, and Opponent, who in contrast plays like an ‘oracle.’ Our idea
to prove consistency of MLTT with CT is to take advantage of these distinction
and asymmetry between Player and Opponent. Concretely, our solution is to modify
the game semantics of MLTT [33] by requiring that only Opponent has to play by
a ‘total,’ ‘effective’ strategy when he plays as an input for Player and moreover
exhibit a realizer for the input strategy at the beginning of each play. Note that
strategies are a much more intensional concept than (partial) maps; we then take
realizers for strategies also as realizers for their extensions (i.e., the partial maps that
the strategies compute) and implement the T-predicate and the result-extracting
function with respect to the resulting realizers for (total) recursive maps N → N.
Consequently, the resulting, modified game semantics constructively validates CT
since it suffices for validating CT to just let Player ‘copy-cat’ the realizer for an input
N→ N given by Opponent, but also it models MLTT as the interpretations of terms
are as abstract as those of the game semantics [33]. The rest of this introduction is
devoted mostly to explaining more in detail this solution to the consistency problem.
Let us first recall games and strategies a` la McCusker [31, 34] that model simple
type theories because our method is based on them. Our review is largely taken
from the author’s earlier work [1, Section 1.4]. A game, roughly, is a certain kind of
a directed rooted forest whose branches represent possible ‘developments’ or (valid)
positions in a ‘game in the usual sense’ (such as chess, poker, etc.).Moves of a game
are nodes of the game, where some moves are distinguished and called initial ; only
initial moves can be the first element or occurrence of a position in the game. Plays
in a game are increasing sequences ǫ,m1,m1m2, . . . of positions in the game, where ǫ
is the empty sequence. For our purpose, it suffices to focus on standard games played
by two participants, Player (P), who represents a ‘computational agent’ or ‘prover,’
and Opponent (O), who represents a ‘computational environment’ or ‘rebutter,’ in
each of which O always starts a play, and then they separately and alternately make
moves allowed by the rules of the game. Strictly speaking, a position in each game
is not just a sequence of moves: Each occurrence m of O’s or O- (resp. P’s or P-)
non-initial move in a position points to a previous occurrence m′ of P- (resp. O-)
move in the position, representing that m is performed specifically as a response to
m′. The pointers are necessary to distinguish similar yet distinct computations [31],
and also they play a crucial role in the game-semantic model of computation [1].
On the other hand, a strategy g on a game G, written g : G, is what tells P which
move (together with a pointer) she should make at each of her turns in the game.
Technically, g is a set of (selected) even-length positions in G that is
• Nonempty and even-prefix-closed (i.e., smn ∈ g ⇒ s ∈ g);
• Deterministic (i.e., smn, smn′ ∈ g ⇒ smn = smn′),
so that it directs P to play by sm 7→ n (with the pointer from n into sm) at each
odd-length position sm in G if and only if there is (necessarily unique) smn ∈ g.
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Then, a game semantics J KG of a simple type theory S interprets a type A of S
as a game JAKG that specifies possible plays between P and O, and a term M : A
[5] of
S as a strategy JMKG : JAKG that describes for P how to play in JAKG; an execution
of the term M is then interpreted as a play in JAKG in which P follows JMKG.
Let us consider examples. The simplest game is the unit game 1, which has no
moves. Thus, it has only the trivial position ǫ and the trivial strategy ⊤ := {ǫ}.
The unit game 1 forms a terminal object in the category G of games and strategies.
Another simple game is the empty game 0, which has an arbitrarily fixed element q
as its only move; its positions are ǫ and q, and so it only has the strategy ⊥ := {ǫ}.
The game semantics J KG interprets the unit-type 1, the empty-type 0 and the unique
canonical [6] term ⊤ : 1 by J1KG := 1, J0KG := 0 and J⊤ : 1KG := ⊤ : 1, respectively.
Yet another example is the game N of natural numbers, which is the rooted tree
(infinite in width)
q
. . .
0
✛
1
✛
2
❄
3
✲
. . .
in which a play starts with O’s question q (‘What is your number?’) and ends with
P’s answer n ∈ N (‘My number is n!’), where n points to q (though this pointer is
omitted in the diagram). Henceforth, we usually skip drawing arrows that represent
edges of a game. A strategy m := {ǫ, qm} on N for each m ∈ N can be represented
by the map q 7→ m equipped with a pointer from m to q (though it is the only
choice). In the following, pointers of most strategies are obvious, and thus we often
omit them. The game semantics J KG interprets the natural number type N and the
numeral m : N by JNKG := N and Jm : NKG := m : N , respectively.
There is a construction ⊗ on games, called tensor (product). Conceptually, a
position s in the tensor A ⊗ B of games A and B is an interleaving mixture of a
position t in A and a position u in B developed ‘in parallel without communication.’
More specifically, t (resp. u) is the subsequence of s consisting of moves of A (resp.
B) such that the change of AB-parity (i.e., the switch between t and u) in s must
be made by O. The pointer of s is inherited from those of t and u in the obvious
manner; this point holds also for other constructions on games and strategies in the
rest of the introduction, and therefore we shall not mention it again. For instance,
a maximal position in the tensor N ⊗N is either of the following forms:[7]
N[0] ⊗ N[1] N[0] ⊗ N[1]
q[0] q[1]
n[0] m[1]
q[1] q[0]
m[1] n[0]
where n,m ∈ N, and ( )[i] (i = 0, 1) are (arbitrary, unspecified) ‘tags’ to distinguish
the two copies of N (but we often omit them if it does not bring confusion), and the
[5]For simplicity, here we focus on closed terms, i.e., ones with the empty context.
[6]See Appendix A.3 for canonical terms.
[7]The diagrams are only to make it explicit which component game each move
belongs to; the two positions are just finite sequences q[0]n[0]q[1]m[1] and q[1]m[1]q[0]n[0]
equipped with the pointers q[i] ← n[i] and q[i] ← m[i] (i = 0, 1).
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arrows represent pointers (n.b., they are not edges of the games). The corresponding
tensor a⊗ b of strategies a : A and b : B is the strategy on A⊗ B that plays by a
if the last O-move is of A, and by b otherwise. For instance, the above two plays in
N ⊗N can be seen as the ones where P plays by the tensor n⊗m : N ⊗N .
Next, a fundamental construction ! on games, called exponential, is basically the
countably infinite iteration of tensor ⊗, i.e., !A
df.
= A ⊗A⊗A · · · for each game A,
where the ‘tag’ for each copy of A is given by ( , i) such that i ∈ N.
Another central construction ⊸, called linear implication, captures the notion
of linear functions, i.e., functions that consume exactly one input to produce an
output. A position in the linear implication A ⊸ B from A to B is almost like a
position in the tensor A⊗B except the following three points:
1 The first occurrence in the position must be a move of B;
2 A change of AB-parity in the position must be made by P;
3 Each occurrence of an initial move (called an initial occurrence) in A points
to an initial occurrence in B.
Thus, a typical position of the game N ⊸ N is the following:
N[0] ⊸ N[1]
q[1]
q[0]
n[0]
m[1]
where n,m ∈ N, which can be read as follows:
1 O’s question q[1] for an output (‘What is your output?’);
2 P’s question q[0] for an input (‘Wait, what is your input?’);
3 O’s answer, say, n[0], to q[0] (‘OK, here is an input n.’);
4 P’s answer, say, m[1], to q[1] (‘Alright, the output is then m.’).
This play corresponds to any linear function that maps n 7→ m. The strategy succ
(resp. double) on N ⊸ N for the successor (resp. doubling) function is represented
by the map q[1] 7→ q[0], q[1]q[0]n[0] 7→ n+ 1[1] (resp. q[1] 7→ q[0], q[1]q[0]n[0] 7→ 2n[1]).
N[0]
succ
⊸ N[1] N[2]
double
⊸ N[3]
q[1] q[3]
q[0] q[2]
m[0] n[2]
m+ 1[1] 2n[3]
Now, let us recall composition on strategies, which is given by internal communi-
cation plus hiding. For instance, the composition succ; double : N ⊸ N of strategies
succ : N ⊸ N and double : N ⊸ N , is given as follows. First, by internal commu-
nication, we mean that P plays the role of O as well in the intermediate component
games N[1] and N[2] by ‘copy-catting’ her last moves, resulting in the following play:
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N[0]
succ
⊸ N[1] N[2]
double
⊸ N[3]
q[3]
q[2]
q[1]
q[0]
n[0]
n+ 1[1]
n+ 1[2]
2(n+ 1)[3]
where each move for internal communication is marked by a square box just for
clarity, and the pointer from q[1] to q[2] is added because the move q[1] is no longer
initial [1, 35]. Importantly, it is assumed that O plays on the game N[0] ⊸ N[3],
‘seeing’ only moves of N[0] or N[3]. Thus, the resulting play is to be read as follows:
1 O’s question q[3] for an output in N[0] ⊸ N[3] (‘What is your output?’);
2 P’s question q[2] by double for an input in N[2] ⊸ N[3] (‘What is an input?’);
3 q[2] triggers the question q[1] for an output in N[0] ⊸ N[3] (‘What is an
output?’);
4 P’s question q[0] by succ for an input in N[0] ⊸ N[3] (‘Wait, what is an
input?’);
5 O’s answer, say, n[0] to q[0] in N[0] ⊸ N[3] (‘Here is an input n.’);
6 P’s answer n+ 1[1] to q[1] by succ in N[0] ⊸ N[3] (‘The output is then
n+ 1.’);
7 n+ 1[1] triggers the answer n+ 1[2] to q[2] in N[2] ⊸ N[3] (‘Here is the
input n+ 1.’);
8 P’s answer 2(n + 1)[3] to q[3] by double in N[2] ⊸ N[3] (‘The output is then
2(n+ 1)!’).
Next, hiding means to hide or delete every move with a square box from the play,
resulting in the strategy for the (linear) function n 7→ 2(n+ 1) as expected:
N[0]
succ;double
⊸ N[3]
q[3]
q[0]
n[0]
2(n+ 1)[3]
Note that hiding makes the resulting play a valid one in the game N[0] ⊸ N[3].
Another construction & on games, called product, is similar to yet simpler than
tensor: A position s in the product A&B of A and B is a position t[0] in A[0] or a
position u[1] in B[1]. In other words, the set of all positions in A&B is the disjoint
union of those in A and B. It forms product in the category G. The corresponding
pairing 〈f, g〉 of strategies f : C ⊸ A and g : C ⊸ B, where C is any game, is the
strategy on C ⊸ A & B that plays by f if O initiates a play by a move of A, and
by g otherwise. The pairing 〈a, b〉 : A & B of strategies a : A and b : B is given by
regarding a and b trivially as strategies on 1⊸ A and 1⊸ B, respectively.
These four constructions ⊗, !, ⊸ and & come from the corresponding ones in
linear logic [36, 37]. Thus, in particular, the usual implication (or the function
space) ⇒ is recovered by Girard translation [36]: A⇒ B := !A⊸ B.
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Girard translation makes it explicit that some functions refer to an input more
than once to produce an output, i.e., there are non-linear functions. For instance,
consider the game (N ⇒ N)⇒ N of higher-order functions, in which the following
position is possible:
!(!N ⊸ N) ⊸ N
q
(q, j)
((q, i), j)
((n, i), j)
(m, j)
(q, j′)
((q, i′), j′)
((n′, i′), j′)
(m′, j′)
l
where n, n′,m,m′, l, i, i′, j, j′ ∈ N, i 6= i′ and j 6= j′, which can be read as follows:
1 O’s question q for an output (‘What is your output?’);
2 P’s question (q, j) for an input function (‘Wait, your first output please!’);
3 O’s question ((q, i), j) for an input (‘What is your first input then?’);
4 P’s answer, say, ((n, i), j), to ((q, i), j) (‘Here is my first input n.’);
5 O’s answer, say, (m, j), to (q, j) (‘OK, then here is my first output m.’);
6 P’s question (q, j′) for an input function (‘Your second output please!’);
7 O’s question ((q, i′), j′) for an input (‘What is your second input then?’);
8 P’s answer, say, ((n′, i′), j′), to ((q, i′), j′) (‘Here is my second input n′.’);
9 O’s answer, say, (m′, j′), to (q, j′) (‘OK, then here is my second output m′.’);
10 P’s answer, say, l, to q (‘Alright, my output is then l.’).
In this play, P asks O twice about an input strategy N ⇒ N . Clearly, such a play
is not possible on the linear implication (N ⊸ N) ⊸ N or (N ⇒ N) ⊸ N . The
strategy pazo : (N ⇒ N) ⇒ N that computes the sum f(0) + f(1) for a given
function f : N→ N, for instance, plays as follows:
!(!N ⊸ N)
pazo
⊸ N
q
(q, 0)
((q, i), 0)
((0, i), 0)
(m, 0)
(q, 1)
((q, i′), 1)
((1, i′), 1)
(m′, 1)
m+m′
where j = 0 and j′ = 1 are arbitrarily chosen, i.e., any j, j′ ∈ N with j 6= j′ work.
Clearly, this computation is impossible on (N ⊸ N)⊸ N or (N ⇒ N)⊸ N .
Finally, let us recall that any strategy f on the implication !A ⊸ B induces its
promotion f † : !A⊸ !B such that if f plays, for instance, as
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!A
f
⊸ B
b1
(a1, i)
(a2, i)
b2
then, for any j ∈ N, the promotion f † plays as
!A
f†
⊸ !B
(b1, j)
(a1, 〈i, j〉)
(a2, 〈i, j〉)
(b2, j)
(b1, j
′)
(a1, 〈i, j′〉)
(a2, 〈i, j′〉)
(b2, j
′)
where 〈 , 〉 : N×N
∼
→ N is an arbitrarily fixed bijection, i.e., f † plays as f for each
thread of a position in !A ⊸ !B that corresponds to a position in !A ⊸ B. The
promotion b† : !B of a strategy b : B is given by regarding b trivially as b : !1⊸ B.
As already indicated, the category G, whose objects are games and morphisms
A→ B are strategies on the implication A⇒ B, is cartesian closed, whose terminal
object, products and exponential objects are given by the unit game 1, the product
& and the implication⇒, respectively. Therefore, following the standard categorical
semantics of simple type theories [38, 39], the game semantics J KG in G interprets
the unit, the product and the function types by 1, & and ⇒, respectively, and a
term x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An ⊢ b : B by a strategy JbKG on the game (JA1KG &
JA2KG & · · ·& JAnKG)⇒ JBKG, where we regard 1 as the 0-ary product &.
Last but not least, there is a constraint on strategies, called winning, such that
winning strategies correspond to proofs in logic. We leave the details of winning to
Section 2 and here only recall one of its axioms: totality. A strategy g : G is total if it
is defined on every odd-length position in the game G. Hence, totality of strategies
is similar to that of partial maps. Conceptually, winning strategies must be total
since intuitively a proof should not get ‘stuck.’ For example, the natural number
game N has total strategies n for all n ∈ N and a non-total one ⊥ := {ǫ}, and the
unique strategy ⊤ on the unit game 1 is total. Crucially, the unique strategy ⊥ on
the empty game 0 is not total (n.b., note the difference between 1 and 0), where
recall that the empty-type 0 is the type of falsity, and hence there is no proof of 0.
In this way, game semantics can exclude strategies that do not compute as proofs.
1.8 Game semantics of intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory
Game semantics, including the one a` la McCusker just reviewed, was applicable
only to simple type theories (and polymorphic ones [27, 40, 41]), not to dependent
ones, for a technical challenge until recently. Nevertheless, the present author has
established game semantics of MLTT [33] based on the one a` la McCusker; we
shall take advantage of this game semantics for the present work. There is another
games-based denotational model of MLTT given by Abramsky et al. [32], but our
consistency proof seems unavailable for it; we shall come back to this point later.
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To convey our main idea, let us sketch how the game semantics [33] models sigma-
and pi-types. For simplicity, we consider a dependent type x : C ⊢ D type with one
variable x. For convenience, we also write G for the set of all positions in a game
G. The game semantics models x : C ⊢ D type as a certain family D = (D(x))x:C of
games D(x) indexed by strategies x on the game C that models the simple type C.
Then, in light of product & on games, which models a particular kind of sigma-
types, viz., product types, it seems a natural idea to interpret the sigma-typeΣ(C,D)
by a game Σ(C,D) such that Σ(C,D) ⊆ C ⊎
⋃
x:C D(x), where ⊎ denotes disjoint
union, and strategies on Σ(C,D) are precisely the pairings 〈c, d〉 of strategies c : C
and d : D(c). However, this idea does not work due to the following two problems:
1 Each game G, by definition, determines the set of all strategies on G;
2 It is impossible for P, when playing on such a game Σ(C,D) if any, to fix a
strategy c : C, let alone a game D(c) on the RHS, at the beginning of a play
since O may (partially) control a choice of a game D(x) on the RHS (x : C).
As an example of the first problem, consider a dependent type x : N ⊢ Nb type such
that canonical terms of the simple type Nb(k) for each k ∈ N are the numerals n
such that n 6 k. However, there is no game G such that G ⊆ N ⊎ N and 〈k, n〉 :
G ⇔ n 6 k for all k, n ∈ N since if such a game G existed then 〈0, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉 : G,
which implies 〈0, 1〉 : G by the definition of strategies on a game, a contradiction.
Hence, no game can properly model the sigma-type Σx:NNb.
Let us also give an example of the second problem. Let x : N ⊢ ListN type be the
dependent type such that canonical terms of the simple type ListN(k) for each k ∈ N
are k-lists of numerals, and assume that we interpret ListN as the family ListN of
games such that ListN (⊥) := ListN (0) := 1 and ListN (n+ 1) := ListN (n)⊗N for
each n ∈ N. If there were a game that models the sigma-type Σ(N, ListN) then for
all k, n1, n2, . . . , nk ∈ N the pairings 〈k, n1⊗n2⊗· · ·⊗nk〉 would be total strategies
on the game; however, there is no such a game since in this case O may completely
select x ∈ N, by his first move in each play, for the x-ary tensor ⊗ of N on the RHS.
Note that totality matters here since MLTT is a formal system for (intuitionistic)
logic, and so strategies in game semantics of MLTT must be all total [33].
To solve these two problems, the previous work [33] reformulates strategies as
deterministic games, i.e., games in which P can play in only one way, called pred-
icative (p-) strategies, and then generalizes games to certain sets of p-strategies,
called predicative (p-) games, in which P first declares a p-strategy in her mind
before a play with O begins, and then O and P play in the declared p-strategy. We
say that a p-strategy is on a p-game if it is an element of the p-game.
The point of the reformulation of strategies as p-strategies is that p-strategies
are defined independently of p-games essentially by containing odd-length positions
as well, which in turn enables us to define p-games in terms of p-strategies. (N.b.,
in contrast, we cannot define a strategy without specifying its underlying game
since a strategy does not define its odd-length positions; also, a game determines
the set of all strategies on the game by definition.) Note that games and strategies
are transformed trivially into particular p-games and p-strategies, respectively: A
strategy σ : G is mapped to the p-strategy P (σ) whose odd-length positions are
those in G, and the game G to the p-game P (G) whose elements are the p-strategies
P (σ). Hence, we regard games and strategies implicitly as p-games and p-strategies,
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respectively, as well. It is also easy to lift constructions on games and strategies to
those on p-games and p-strategies. Then, the dependence of strategies on games
explains why there is no game that models the sigma-type Σ(N,Nb), but the p-
game Σ(N,Nb) := {〈⊥,⊤〉}∪
⋃
k∈NNk, where Nk := {〈k, n〉 | n 6 k }, does (n.b., we
include the pairing 〈⊥,⊤〉 into Σ(N,Nb) for axioms on p-games; see Definition 2.23).
For instance, plays in Σ(N,Nb) by the p-strategy 〈7, 3〉 ∈ Σ(N,Nb) look like
Σ(N, Nb) Σ(N, Nb)
qΣ(N,Nb) qΣ(N,Nb)
〈7, 3〉 〈7, 3〉
q q
7 3
where Judge (J)[8] first asks P the question qΣ(N,Nb) (‘What is your p-strategy?’)
and P answers it by the p-strategy 〈7, 3〉 ∈ Σ(N,Nb) (‘I declare the p-strategy
〈7, 3〉!’), and then a play in the declared p-strategy 〈7, 3〉 between P and O follows.
Although the declaration of a p-strategy is not strictly necessary in this case, it
is clear why P cannot play by the p-strategy 〈0, 1〉 on the p-game Σ(N,Nb): It is
because 〈0, 1〉 /∈ Σ(N,Nb) by the definition of Σ(N,Nb). We emphasize here that
the definition of the p-game Σ(N,Nb) is made possible by reversing the traditional
relation between games and strategies: P-games are defined in terms of p-strategies.
Next, the declaration of p-strategies in p-games solves the second problem: The
p-game Σ(N,ListN ) := {〈⊥,⊤〉}∪{〈k, n1⊗n2⊗· · ·⊗nk〉 | k, n1, n2, . . . , nk ∈ N } in
fact models the sigma-type Σ(N, ListN), where we again include the pairing 〈⊥,⊤〉
into Σ(N,ListN ) for the axioms on p-games. Typical plays in Σ(N,ListN ) look like
Σ(N, ListN ) Σ(N, ListN )
qΣ(N,ListN ) qΣ(N,ListN )
〈2, 1⊗ 3〉 〈2, 1⊗ 3〉
q q
2 3
q
1
where the declaration of the p-strategy 〈2, 1⊗3〉 ∈ Σ(N,ListN) fixes the underlying
game on the RHS (n.b., a p-strategy is a game, and so it specifies its odd-length
positions as well) so that O must play on the 2-ary tensor N ⊗ N there. In this
way, the p-strategy 〈2, 1⊗ 3〉 is a total one on the p-game Σ(N,ListN ). Intuitively,
recalling that the generalization of simple type theories to dependent ones (or that
of propositional logic to predicate logic) is made by introducing dependent types (or
predicates) that refer to individuals, i.e., terms (or proofs), we may understand the
declaration of p-strategies in p-games as (part of) the game-semantic counterpart
of the generalization because it enables P in p-games to refer to p-strategies.
Moreover, the game semantics [33] defines the p-game Π(C,D) that models the
pi-type Πx:CD as follows: A p-strategy on Π(C,D) is the union φ :=
⋃
c∈C Φc on a
family Φ = (Φc)c∈C of p-strategies Φc indexed by p-strategies c ∈ C such that
1 For each c ∈ C, we have Φc ∈ c⇒ d for some p-strategy d ∈ D(c), where we
regard the game c⇒ d as a p-game (as remarked before);
[8]The game semantics of MLTT [33] introduces J for a conceptual reason; techni-
cally, however, J is not necessary, and we may replace J’s or J-moves by O-moves.
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2 For any pair c, c˜ ∈ C, Φc and Φc˜ compute in the same manner at the same
odd-length position sm ∈ Φc ∩ Φc˜ (i.e., Φc(sm) ≃ Φc˜(sm)),
where we write x ↓ if an element x is defined, and x ↑ otherwise, and let ≃ denote
the Kleene equality, i.e., x ≃ y
df.
⇔ (x ↓ ∧ y ↓ ∧ x = y)∨ (x ↑ ∧ y ↑). The first axiom
is to ensure that the p-strategy φ respects the type dependency of the pi-type Πx:CD,
i.e., φ ◦ c† ∈ D(c) for each c ∈ C, where the composition φ ◦ c† is given by trivially
identifying p-strategies on C with those on 1⇒ C. On the other hand, the second
axiom is to guarantee determinacy of φ so that it is a well-defined p-strategy. Also,
the second axiom ensures that φ may inspect an input c ∈ C only gradually by a
finite interaction between φ and c (just as in traditional game semantics), which
makes the interpretation of pi-types very natural as semantics of computation (e.g.,
the extension of φ forms a continuous function [33]).
To summarize, the game semantics [33] models MLTT by reformulating strategies
as p-strategies and games as p-games, and then allowing P to control possible plays
for O by her initial protocol with J. In particular, the p-games Π(Σ(X,Y ), Z) and
Π(X,Π(Y, Z)) for any (families of) p-games X , Y and Z such that the sigma and
the pi constructions make sense coincide up to ‘tags’ for disjoint union; thus, the
game semantics trivially validates the ξ-rule. Let us call p-games that model sigma-
and pi-types sigma p-games and pi p-games, respectively. It is easy to see that sigma
and pi p-games generalize product and function games, respectively.
Remark In the previous work [33], strategies and p-strategies in the sense given
above are rather called skeletons and tree (t-) skeletons, respectively, and strategies
and p-strategies are slightly more abstract concepts, which follows [42]. We employ
this abuse of the terminologies here for simplicity, but we correct it in Section 2.
1.9 Game semantics is not directly applicable to formal Church’s thesis
Let us next apply the game semantics of MLTT [33] to CT. Recall that it models the
empty-type 0 by the p-game 0 := {⊥}, called the empty p-game, where ⊥ := {ǫ, q}.
It then models the T-predicate x : N, y : N, z : N ⊢ T(x, y, z) type by the family T =
(T (〈x, y, z〉))x,y,z∈N of p-games T (〈x, y, z〉), where 〈x, y, z〉 is the evident iteration
of pairings, given by T (〈x, y, z〉) := 1 if x = e, y = n, z = c for some e, n, c ∈ N, and
the triple (e, n, c) satisfies the T-predicate relation, and T (〈x, y, z〉) := 0 otherwise.
Also, it models the result-extracting function x : N ⊢ U(x) : N by a p-strategy µ ∈
N ⇒ N whose extension n ∈ N 7→ µ◦n† ∈ N matches the result-extracting function
in the evident sense. Finally, it models an Id-type IdA, where let A be a simple type
for simplicity, by the family IdA = (IdA(〈a1, a2〉))a1,a2∈A of p-games IdA(〈a1, a2〉),
called Id p-games on A, where A is the p-game that interprets the simple type A,
given by IdA(〈a1, a2〉) := 1 if a1 = a2, and IdA(〈a1, a2〉) := 0 otherwise.
We are now able to see how the p-game CT that interprets CT (2) by the game
semantics [33] looks like. Clearly, the only nontrivial point in giving a p-strategy on
CT is the LHS of the first occurrence of a sigma p-game, i.e., a p-strategy on the
p-game (N ⇒ N) ⇒ N that outputs a p-strategy e ∈ N from an input p-strategy
φ ∈ N ⇒ N given by O such that e ∈ N realizes φ. Recall that we have defined
realizers for the extension N → N of φ to be realizers for φ and implement the T-
predicate and the result-extracting function with respect to these realizers; hence,
a realizer e for φ, if any, works as a witness of the LHS of the sigma p-game in CT .
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However, there is no such a p-strategy on (N ⇒ N) ⇒ N because O may play
on the domain N ⇒ N as a non-recursive function f : N → N so that there is no
natural number that realizes f . Strictly speaking, we should say that the extension
of the play by O is f , but let us keep using this abuse of terminologies in the rest
of this introduction. Another problem is that O may play as a partial function
N ⇀ N on the domain. Unfortunately, the game semantics [33] refutes CT even if
we somehow manage to restrict plays by O to total recursive ones since positions in
games are finite, i.e., it is in general impossible for P or a p-strategy to completely
identify a given p-strategy N ⇒ N by a finite interaction with it.
1.10 Our solution: realizability a` la game semantics
Then, how can we model MLTT plus CT? Our solution is to limit O’s plays as
inputs to total recursive ones and also require him to exhibit a realizer for his input
play at the beginning of each play. The resulting, modified game semantics, which
we call realizability a` la game semantics, models MLTT in a way similar to the game
semantics [33] as both do not assign a choice of a realizer to the interpretation of
each term. On the other hand, the main difference between the two models of MLTT
is that only realizability a` la game semantics validates CT since it requires O to
exhibit a realizer for each input N ⇒ N of the p-game CT , and so there is trivially
a p-strategy on CT that essentially ‘copy-cats’ the realizer given by O. Crucially,
O may supply the realizers since game semantics in general treats O as an ‘oracle’
endowed with an unlimited computational power. Hence, realizability a` la game
semantics models MLTT plus CT. Also, it refutes the empty-type 0 as it requires
p-strategies to be winning, thence proving consistency of MLTT with CT.
Technically, we implement our solution by modifying p-strategies on the pi p-
game Π(C,D) (Section 1.8) into the disjoint union ψ := ⊎e∈Rwr(C)Ψe on a family
Ψ = (Ψe)e∈Rwr(C) of p-strategies Ψe ∈ r(e)⇒ r ◦ πΨ(e), where
• Rwr(C) ⊆ N is the set of all realizers for winning, realizable p-strategies c ∈ C;
• r(e) is the p-strategy realized by e ∈ N, and πΨ is a map e ∈ Rwr(C) 7→
πΨ(e) ∈ Rwr(D(r(e))).
We take the disjoint union of Ψ for ψ since the union of Ψ may be indeterministic
for the lack of the second axiom on p-strategies on the original pi p-games. Also,
the extension of ψ is in general no longer continuous, but in return, by the disjoint
union, O must select a component Ψe and exhibit e at his first move in the modified
Π(C,D), where e is a realizer for his play on C. In contrast, this task is not imposed
on P. Let us write Π for the modified pi p-games in the rest of this introduction.
On the other hand, ψ is a p-strategy, not a realizer for it, and modified pi p-
games are as abstract as the original ones. Thus, the isomorphism Π(Σ(X,Y ), Z) ∼=
Π(X,Π(Y, Z)) holds also for modified pi p-games. This point illustrates why realiz-
ability a` la game semantics validates the ξ-rule as well.
Schematically, a typical play by our p-strategy ct : CT looks like
Π(ν : N ⇒ N, Σ(x : N, Π(y : N, Σ(z : N, T (x, y, z) & IdN (µ ◦ z†, ν ◦ x†)))))
qCT
ct
q[e]
e[e]
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where the subscript ( )[e] (e ∈ N) represents the ‘tag’ for the disjoint union on the
leftmost occurrence of a pi p-game, and so e is a realizer for an input p-strategy
ν ∈ N ⇒ N . In this play, the p-strategy ct never interacts with ν but ‘copy-cats’ the
realizer e given by O. Let us emphasize that such a play by ct would be impossible
in the presence of the second axiom on p-strategies on the origianl pi p-games.
Another typical play by the p-strategy ct looks like
Π(ν : N ⇒ N, Σ(x : N, Π(y : N, Σ(z : N, T (x, y, z) & IdN (µ ◦ z†, ν ◦ x†)))))
qCT
ct
q[e′],[e]
q[e′],[e]
n[e′],[e]
c[e′],[e]
where the triple e, n, c ∈ N satisfies the T-predicate relation, and ( )[e′] (e
′ ∈ N) is
the ‘tag’ for the disjoint union on the rightmost occurrence of a pi p-game, and thus
e′ is a realizer for the input p-strategy n ∈ N given by O. Note that the p-games
T (e, n, c) and IdN (µ◦c†, ν ◦n†) both become the unit p-game 1 in this play by their
definitions, and therefore ct trivially validates them.
Finally, note that ct is a p-strategy, not a realizer for it. This point illustrates the
fact that realizability a` la game semantics is as abstract as the game semantics of
MLTT [33], and so it models MLTT. On the other hand, ct itself is realizable in a
certain sense, which means that we give a constructive model of MLTT plus CT.
1.11 Our contribution and related work
Our main contribution is to solve the long-standing open problem, i.e., consistency
of MLTT with CT, by a novel method of realizability a` la game semantics that
resolves the dilemma between intensionality and extensionality. Methodologically,
the present work opens up a new way of applying game semantics to the study of
constructive mathematics, while in the literature game semantics has been applied
mostly in the context of full abstraction/completeness problems [43].
Our consistency proof is based on the game semantics of MLTT [33], especially its
interpretation of pi-types. This technique does not seem to be available for another
games-based model of MLTT [32] since it interprets pi-types differently by induction
on the length of positions. Thus, the previous work [33] plays a crucial role here.
As related work, Ishihara et al. [24] prove consistency of a modification of MLTT,
called mTT, with CT by realizability a` la Kleene formalized within another formal
system. The main difference between MLTT and mTT is that MLTT’s congruence
rules such as the ξ-rule are replaced with explicit substitutions in mTT so that
their realizability models mTT. On the other hand, their realizability does not
model MLTT precisely because it refutes the ξ-rule as already explained. In other
words, they circumvent the consistency problem of MLTT plus CT for the technical
obstacle but instead prove consistency of mTT with CT, which nevertheless suffices
for one of the author’s research programme: a minimalist foundation for constructive
mathematics [16]. Ishihara et al. [24, Section 8] conclude by stating that
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Unfortunately, the consistency of Church’s thesis with full Martin-Lo¨f’s is still
open, and it is presumably quite difficult to answer this question.
Finally, our consistency result also contributes to the programme of a minimalist
foundation for constructive mathematics since it implies that MLTT is available as
an intensional level foundation of constructive mathematics for the programme.
1.12 Structure of the present article
The rest of the present article is structured as follows. We first recall basic definitions
given in the previous work [33], in particular p-games and p-strategies, in Section 2
as a technical preparation. We then establish realizability a` la game semantics that
models MLTT plus CT and prove consistency of MLTT with CT as an immediate
corollary in Section 3. Finally, we draw a conclusion and propose future work in
Section 4. In addition, Appendix A presents the syntax of MLTT.
Notation At the end of this introduction, let us introduce the following notations:
• We employ bold small letters s, t,u,v, w, etc. for sequences, and small letters
a, b, c,m, n, x, y, etc. for elements of sequences;
• We define n := {1, 2, . . . , n } for each n ∈ N+ := N \ {0}, and 0 := ∅;
• We often abbreviate a finite sequence s = (x1, x2, . . . , x|s|) as x1x2 . . . x|s|,
where |s| denotes the length (i.e., the number of elements) of s, and write
s(i), where i ∈ |s|, as another notation for xi;
• A concatenation of sequences s and t is represented by the juxtaposition st
(or written s.t) of them, and we write as, tb, ucv for (a)s, t(b), u(c)v, etc.;
• We write Even(s) (resp. Odd(s)) if s is of even- (resp. odd-) length, and given
a set S of sequences and P ∈ {Even,Odd}, we define SP := {s ∈ S | P (s) };
• We write s  t if s is a prefix of t, and Pref(S) for the set of all prefixes of
elements in a set S of sequences, i.e., Pref(S) := {s | ∃t ∈ S. s  t };
• We define X∗ := {x1x2 . . . xn | n ∈ N, ∀i ∈ n. xi ∈ X } for each set X ;
• Given a map f : A → B and a subset S ⊆ A, we define f ↾ S : S → B
to be the restriction of f to S, and f∗ : A∗ → B∗ by f∗(a1a2 . . . an) :=
f(a1)f(a2) . . . f(an) ∈ B∗ for all a1a2 . . . an ∈ A∗;
• Given sets X1, X2, . . . , Xn, and a natural number i ∈ n, we write π
(n)
i or πi
for the ith-projection (map) X1 ×X2 × · · · ×Xn → Xi.
2 Review: predicative games and predicative strategies
First, we review the game semantics of MLTT [33] since our consistency proof is
based on it, where we mostly focus on the basic definitions necessary for the present
work. See the original article [33] for more details and explanations.
We first recall key preliminary concepts such as arenas, legal positions, games and
tree skeletons in Section 2.1, and consistency/completeness of tree skeletons and
universal identification in Section 2.2. Then finally, we recall the central notions of
p-games and p-strategies in Section 2.3.
2.1 Arenas, legal positions, games and tree skeletons
We first need to confess our simplification of game semantics in the introduction: To
be precise, p-strategies are deterministic games up to inessential details of ‘tags’ for
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disjoint unions on moves, and a deterministic game (on the nose) is called a tree (t-)
skeleton [33]. More accurately, a p-strategy is the union of all equivalent t-skeletons
modulo ‘tags.’ Also, what is described as strategies in the introduction is, strictly,
skeletons, and a strategy is the union of all equivalent skeletons modulo ‘tags.’ Such
a complication is necessary for game semantics to match the abstraction degree of
terms in type theories. We henceforth switch to the precise terminologies.
We then start with recalling t-skeletons, for which it makes sense to first introduce
a more general concept of games. But before that, we need to recall two preliminary
concepts: arenas and legal positions. An arena defines the basic components of a
game, which in turn induces legal positions of the arena that specify the basic rules
of the game in the sense that each position of the game must be legal.
Definition 2.1 (Moves [33]) Let us fix, throughout the present work, arbitrary
pairwise distinct symbols O, P, Q and A, and call them labels. Amove is any triple
mxy := (m,x, y) such that x ∈ {O,P} and y ∈ {Q,A}, for which we often abbreviate
mxy as m, and instead define λ(m) := xy, λOP(m) := x and λQA(m) := y. A move
m is called an Opponent (O-) move if λOP(m) = O, a Player (P-) move if
λOP(m) = P, a question if λQA(m) = Q, and an answer if λQA(m) = A.
Definition 2.2 (Arenas [33, 44]) An arena is a pair G = (MG,⊢G) such that
• MG is a set of moves;
• ⊢G is a subset of ({⋆} ∪MG) ×MG, where ⋆ (or represented more precisely
by ⋆G) is an arbitrarily fixed element such that ⋆ 6∈MG, called the enabling
relation, that satisfies
– (E1) If ⋆ ⊢G m then λ(m) = OQ;
– (E2) If m ⊢G n and λQA(n) = A then λQA(m) = Q;
– (E3) If m ⊢G n and m 6= ⋆ then λOP(m) 6= λOP(n).
A move m ∈MG of G is called initial if ⋆ ⊢G m, and non-initial otherwise. We
define M InitG := {m ∈MG | ⋆ ⊢G m } ⊆MG
That is, an arena G is to specify moves of a game, each of which is O’s/P’s
question/answer, and which move n can be performed for each move m during a
play in the game in terms of the relation m ⊢G n (see Definition 2.4 for more on
this point), where ⋆ ⊢G m means that O can initiate a play by m in the game.
The axioms E1, E2 and E3 are then to be read as follows:
• E1 sets the convention that an initial move must be O’s question;
• E2 states that an answer must be performed for a question;
• E3 says that an O-move must be performed for a P-move, and vice versa.
We shall later focus on well-founded arenas:
Definition 2.3 (Well-founded arenas [45]) An arena G is well-founded if so is
the enabling relation ⊢G downwards, i.e., there is no countably infinite sequence
(mi)i∈N of moves mi ∈MG such that ⋆ ⊢G m0 and mi ⊢G mi+1 for all i ∈ N.
Let us proceed to review legal positions, for which recall first that a legal position
is a certain finite sequence of moves equipped with a pointer from later occurrences
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to earlier ones of the sequence. The idea is that each non-initial occurrence in a legal
position must be performed for a specific previous occurrence, and such a pair of
occurrences is specified by a pointer. Technically, pointers are introduced in order
to distinguish similar yet different computations [31, 46].
We call a finite sequence of moves together with a pointer a justified (j-) sequence;
a legal position is a particular kind of a j-sequence.
Definition 2.4 (Justified sequences [33]) An occurrence in a finite sequence s
is a pair (s(i), i) such that i ∈ |s|. A justified (j-) sequence is a pair s = (s,Js)
of a finite sequence s of moves and a map Js : |s| → {0} ∪ |s| − 1 such that
0 6 Js(i) < i for all i ∈ |s|, called the pointer of the j-sequence. Each occurrence
(s(i), i) is initial (resp. non-initial) in s if Js(i) = 0 (resp. otherwise).
A justified (j-) sequence in an arena G is a j-sequence s such that its elements
are moves of G, and its pointer respects the enabling relation of G, i.e., it satisfies
s ∈ M∗G and ∀i ∈ |s|.
(
Js(i) = 0 ⇒ ⋆ ⊢G s(i)
)
∧
(
Js(i) 6= 0 ⇒ s(Js(i)) ⊢G s(i)
)
.
We write JG for the set of all j-sequences in an arena G.
Convention We say that the occurrence (s(Js(i)),Js(i)) is the justifier of a non-
initial one (s(i), i) in a j-sequence s, and (s(i), i) is justified by (s(Js(i)),Js(i)).
Definition 2.5 (Justified subsequences [33]) A justified (j-) subsequence of a
j-sequence s is a j-sequence t such that t is a subsequence of s, and for all i, j ∈ N
Jt(i) = j if and only if J ns (i) = j for some n ∈ N.
Convention We are henceforth casual about the distinction between moves and
occurrences; by abuse of notation, we often keep the pointer Js of each j-sequence
s = (s,Js) implicit and abbreviate occurrences (s(i), i) in s as s(i). Moreover, we
often write Js(s(i)) = s(j) if Js(i) = j for all i, j ∈ N.
Next, we recall the ‘relevant part’ or view of the previous occurrences of each
occurrence in a j-sequence, which is also fundamental for legal positions.
Definition 2.6 (Views [34, 31, 44]) The Player (P-) view ⌈s⌉ and the Op-
ponent (O-) view ⌊s⌋ of a j-sequence s are respectively the j-subsequences of s
defined by the following induction on the length |s| of s:
• ⌈ǫ⌉ := ǫ;
• ⌈sm⌉ := ⌈s⌉.m if m is a P-move;
• ⌈sm⌉ := m if m is initial;
• ⌈smtn⌉ := ⌈s⌉.mn if n is an O-move such that m justifies n;
• ⌊ǫ⌋ := ǫ;
• ⌊sm⌋ := ⌊s⌋.m if m is an O-move;
• ⌊smtn⌋ := ⌊s⌋.mn if n is a P-move such that m justifies n.
A Player (P-) view (resp. a Opponent (O-) view) refers to that of some
j-sequence, and a view (of a j-sequence) to a P- or O-view (of the j-sequence).
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The idea behind the notion of views is as follows. Given a nonempty j-sequence sm
such that m is a P- (resp. O-) move, the P-view ⌈s⌉ (resp. O-view ⌊s⌋) is intended
to be the currently ‘relevant part’ of the previous occurrences in s for P (resp. O).
I.e., P (resp. O) is concerned only with the last occurrence of an O- (resp. P-) move,
its justifier and that justifier’s P- (resp. O-) view, which then recursively proceeds.
See [46, 47] for an explanation of views in terms of their counterparts in syntax.
We are now ready to recall legal positions :
Definition 2.7 (Legal positions [33, 31, 34]) A legal position is a j-sequence s
that satisfies
• (Alternation) If s = s1mns2, then λ
OP(m) 6= λOP(n);
• (Visibility) If s = tmu with m non-initial, then Js(m) occurs in ⌈t⌉ if m is
a P-move, and in ⌊t⌋ otherwise.
A legal position in an arena G is a legal position that is a j-sequence in G.
We write LG for the set of all legal positions in G.
As already stated, legal positions are to specify the basic rules of a game in the
sense that each position in the game must be legal so that
• During a play in the game, O makes the first move by a question, and then
P and O alternately perform moves (by alternation), where each non-initial
move is performed for a specific previous occurrence, viz., its justifier;
• The justifier of each non-initial occurrence belongs to the ‘relevant part’ or
view of the previous occurrences (by visibility).
Having reviewed arenas and legal positions, we are now able to recall games and
deterministic games called t-skeletons :
Definition 2.8 (Games [33, 34, 31]) A game is a set G of legal positions, called
(valid) positions in G, that satisfies
• (Tree) The set G is nonempty and prefix-closed (i.e., sm ∈ G⇒ s ∈ G);
• (Wfoud) The arena Arn(G) := (MG,⊢G) is well-founded,
where MG := {s(i) | s ∈ G, i ∈ |s| } and ⊢G := {(⋆, s(j)) | s ∈ G,Js(j) = 0 } ∪
{(s(i), s(j)) | s ∈ S,Js(j) = i }. A subgame of G is a game H such that H ⊆ G.
Nonemptiness and prefix-closure of a game G formulates the natural phenomenon
that each nonempty ‘moment’ or position has a previous ‘moment.’ The underlying
arena Arn(G) of G is well-founded so that we can impose winning, more specifically
noetherianity (Definition 2.11), on identities in the categories of games; see [33] for
the details. Also, note that every position in G is a legal position in Arn(G).
Definition 2.9 (Tree skeletons [33]) A tree (t-) skeleton is a game σ that is
deterministic: smn, smn′ ∈ σEven ⇒ smn = smn. A t-skeleton σ is on a game
G, written σ :: G, if it satisfies σ ⊆ G and (sm ∈ GOdd ∧ s ∈ σ)⇒ sm ∈ σ.
In other words, a t-skeleton on a game G is a deterministic subgame σ ⊆ G such
that possible plays by O in σ coincide precisely with those in G. Hence, such a
t-skeleton σ :: G describes for P how to play in G.
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Clearly, skeletons, i.e., what is called strategies in Section 1.7, on G correspond
bijectively to t-skeletons on G. The main difference between the two is, however,
that a skeleton needs its underlying game, but a t-skeleton does not.
Example 2.10 The simplest game is the unit game 1 := {ǫ}. There is only the
trivial t-skeleton ⊤ := {ǫ} on 1.
Another simple game is the empty game 0 := {ǫ, qOQ}, where q is an arbitrarily
fixed element. There is only the unique t-skeleton ⊥ := {ǫ, q } on 0.
The natural number game N is given by N := Pref({qOQnPA | n ∈ N }), where
q justifies n. T-skeletons on N are ⊥ := {ǫ, q} and n := {ǫ, q, qn } for each n ∈ N.
At this point, recall that not every t-skeleton corresponds to a proof [31, 33]. For
instance, the empty-game 0 models the empty-type or falsity 0 [33], and therefore
the t-skeleton ⊥ :: 0 cannot be an interpretation of a proof. This point matters for
the present work since our consistency proof relies on a model of MLTT plus CT
that does not inhabit the empty-type; that is, we need to carve out t-skeletons that
compute as proofs in such a way that the t-skeleton ⊥ :: 0 is excluded.
The previous work [33] characterizes such t-skeletons for proofs as winning ones:
Definition 2.11 (Constraints on tree skeletons [44, 31, 45, 33]) A t-skeleton σ is
• Total if it always responds: ∀sm ∈ σOdd. ∃smn ∈ σ;
• Innocent if its computation depends only on P-views: ∀smn ∈ σEven, s˜m˜ ∈
σOdd. ⌈sm⌉ = ⌈s˜m˜⌉ ⇒ ∃s˜m˜n˜ ∈ σEven. ⌈smn⌉ = ⌈s˜m˜n˜⌉;
• Noetherian if there is no strictly increasing infinite sequence of elements in
the set ⌈σ⌉ := {⌈s⌉ | s ∈ σ } of all P-views in σ;
• Winning if it is total, innocent and noetherian.
Example 2.12 The t-skeletons ⊤ :: 1 and n :: N for each n ∈ N are winning,
while the t-skeleton ⊥ :: 0 is not even total, let alone winning, as desired.
Intuitively, we regard winning t-skeletons as proofs (in classical logic) as follows.[9]
First, a proof should not get ‘stuck,’ and so t-skeletons for proofs must be total.
Next, recall that imposing innocence on t-skeletons corresponds to excluding stateful
terms [31]. Then, since logic is concerned with truths of formulas, which are invariant
to ‘passage of time,’ proofs should not depended on ‘states of arguments.’ Thus, we
impose innocence on t-skeletons for proofs. In addition, we also impose noetherianity
on t-skeletons for proofs to handle infinite plays: If a play by an innocent, noetherian
t-skeleton keeps growing infinitely then it cannot be P’s ‘intention,’ and so the play
must be a valid argument or win for P. Technically, we need noetherianity since
total t-skeletons are not closed under composition but winning ones are [27, 45, 33].
Various full completeness results in the literature [31, 32] indicate that winning is
not only necessary but also sufficient as a characterization of t-skeletons for proofs.
[9]We may further impose well-bracketing [44, 31, 33] on winning t-skeletons so that
they would correspond to proofs in intuitionistic logic. Nevertheless, it is not necessary
for the present work, and therefore let us skip it for brevity.
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Finally, recall that we have already sketched constructions on games and skeletons
[34, 31] in Section 1.7, and constructions on t-skeletons are essentially the same as
those on skeletons [33]. Let us next present their mathematical formalizations:
Convention For brevity, we omit ‘tags’ for disjoint union ⊎ of sets of moves except
the ones for exponential !. For instance, we write x ∈ A⊎B if x ∈ A or x ∈ B; also,
given relations RA ⊆ A×A and RB ⊆ B×B, we write RA⊎RB for the relation on
the disjoint union A ⊎B such that (x, y) ∈ RA ⊎RB
df.
⇔ (x, y) ∈ RA ∨ (x, y) ∈ RB.
Definition 2.13 (Constructions on arenas [31, 34, 44]) Given arenas A and B,
we define arenas
• A ⊎B := (MA ⊎MB,⊢A ⊎ ⊢B);
• A⊸ B := ({axy | axy ∈MA } ⊎MB,⊢A⊸B), where O := P, P := O, ⋆ ⊢A⊸B
m :⇔ ⋆ ⊢B m and m ⊢A⊸B n :⇔ m ⊢A n ∨m ⊢B n ∨ (⋆ ⊢B m ∧ ⋆ ⊢A n);
• !A := ({(a, i)xy | axy ∈ MA, i ∈ N },⊢!A), where ⋆ ⊢!A (a, i) :⇔ ⋆ ⊢A a and
(a, i) ⊢!A (a′, i′) :⇔ i = i′ ∧ a ⊢A a′.
Definition 2.14 (Tensor on games [34, 31]) The tensor of games G and H is
the game
G⊗H := { s ∈ LArn(G)⊎Arn(H) | ∀X ∈ {G,H}. s ↾ X ∈ X },
where s ↾ X is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of X .
Definition 2.15 (Linear implication on games [34, 31]) The linear implication
between games G and H is the game
G⊸ H := { s ∈ LArn(G)⊸Arn(H) | ∀X ∈ {G,H}. s ↾ X ∈ X }.
By the alternation axiom on legal positions (Definition 2.7), it is easy to see that
only O (resp. P) may switch between games G and H during a play in the tensor
G⊗H (resp. the linear implication G⊸ H) [27], which matches the description of
tensor (resp. linear implication) on games given in Section 1.7.
Definition 2.16 (Product on games [34, 31]) The product of games G and H is
the game
G&H := { s ∈ LArn(G)⊎Arn(H) | (s ↾ G ∈ G ∧ s ↾ H = ǫ) ∨ (s ↾ G = ǫ ∧ s ↾ H ∈ H) }.
Definition 2.17 (Exponential on games [34, 31]) The exponential of a game
G is the game !G := {s ∈ L!Arn(G) | ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ i ∈ G }, where s ↾ i is the
j-subsequence of s that consists of moves (a, i), where a ∈MG, changed into a.
Definition 2.18 (Constructions on tree skeletons between games [42, 33]) Given
t-skeletons φ :: A ⊸ B, σ :: C ⊸ D, τ :: A ⊸ C, ψ :: B ⊸ C and ϕ :: !A ⊸ B
between games, we define
Yamada Page 24 of 62
• The tensor φ⊗ σ :: A⊗ C ⊸ B ⊗D of φ and σ by
φ⊗ σ := { s ∈ LArn(A⊗C⊸B⊗D) | s ↾ A,B ∈ φ, s ↾ C,D ∈ σ },
where s ↾ A,B (resp. s ↾ C,D) is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves
of A or B (resp. C or D);
• The pairing 〈φ, τ〉 :: A⊸ B & C of σ and τ by
〈φ, τ〉 := { s ∈ LArn(A⊸B&C) | (s ↾ A,B ∈ φ∧s ↾ C = ǫ)∨(s ↾ A,C ∈ τ∧s ↾ B = ǫ) };
• The composition φ;ψ :: A⊸ C (also written ψ ◦ φ) of φ and ψ by
φ;ψ := { s ↾ A,C | s ∈ φ ‖ ψ },
where φ ‖ ψ := { s ∈ JArn(((A⊸B[0])⊸B[1])⊸C) | s ↾ A,B[0] ∈ φ, s ↾ B[1], C ∈
ψ, s ↾ B[0], B[1] ∈ cpB }, the subscripts ( )[i] are to distinguish the two copies
of B, and cpB := { t ∈ B[0] ⊸ B[1] | ∀u  t.Even(u)⇒ u ↾ B[0] = u ↾ B[1] };
• The promotion ϕ† :: !A⊸ !B of ϕ by
ϕ† := { s ∈ LArn(!A⊸!B) | ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ i ∈ ϕ },
where s ↾ i is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of the form (b, i)
such that b ∈ MB and i ∈ N, or (a, 〈i, j〉) such that a ∈ MA and i, j ∈ N,
changed into b and (a, j), respectively, and 〈 , 〉 : N×N
∼
→ N is an arbitrarily
fixed bijection.
Notation We employ the following notations:
• Given a t-skeleton σ :: G, we write σ1 :: 1 ⊸ G and σ!1 :: 1 ⇒ G for the
t-skeletons both of which coincide with σ up to ‘tags.’
• Given t-skeletons φ :: 1 ⊸ G and φ′ :: 1 ⇒ G, we write φ1, φ
′
!1 :: G for the
t-skeletons that coincide with φ and φ′ up to ‘tags,’ respectively.
• Given t-skeletons ψ :: A⊸ B and α :: A, we define ψ ◦ α := (ψ ◦ α1)1 :: B.
• Given t-skeletons α :: A and β :: B, we define α⊗β := ((α1⊗β1)◦∆)1 :: A⊗B,
where ∆ is the unique t-skeleton on 1⊸ 1⊗1, and 〈α, β〉 := 〈α1, β1〉1 :: A&B.
• Given a t-skeleton α :: A, we define α† := (α!1)†!1 :: !A.
• Given an innocent t-skeleton θ :: !G, we write θ‡ :: G for the unique (innocent)
t-skeleton that satisfies (θ‡)† = θ.
2.2 Consistency/completeness of tree skeletons and universal identification
Let us next recall a few more preliminary concepts for p-games: consistency and
completeness of t-skeletons, and the universal identification on j-sequences.
Roughly, a nonempty set S of t-skeletons is consistent if there is a game G such
that every element of S is a t-skeleton on G, or equivalently:
Definition 2.19 (Consistency of tree skeletons [33]) A nonempty set S of t-
skeletons is consistent if
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1 The arena (
⋃
σ∈S Mσ,
⋃
σ∈S ⊢σ) is well-founded;
2 ∀σ, τ ∈ S, sm ∈ (σ ∪ τ)Odd. s ∈ (σ ∩ τ)⇒ sm ∈ (σ ∩ τ).
We write σ ≍ σ˜ and say that t-skeletons σ and σ˜ are consistent if the two-element
set {σ, σ˜ } is consistent.
The union
⋃
S of a consistent set S of t-skeletons forms a game such that each
element of S is a t-skeleton on
⋃
S (but not necessarily vice versa), and conversely
the set of all t-skeletons on a game G is consistent. Hence, Definition 2.19 in fact
formulates the intended meaning of consistency on t-skeletons. Hence, given a set
P of t-skeletons, each consistent subset S ⊆ P (not necessarily faithfully) identifies
a game
⋃
S contained in P ; we utilize consistency on sets of t-skeletons in this way.
We may further impose completeness on consistent sets of t-skeletons such that
complete sets of t-skeletons correspond bijectively to games:
Definition 2.20 (Completeness of tree skeletons [33]) A consistent set S of t-
skeletons is complete if any subset A ⊆
⋃
S is an element of S whenever it is a
t-skeleton on the game
⋃
S.
By a bijection G
∼
7→ { σ | σ :: G } between games G and complete sets { σ | σ :: G }
of t-skeletons σ, we may identify games with complete sets of t-skeletons as the
previous work [33] does. We encourage the reader to see that the first problem in
modeling sigma-types by games sketched in Section 1.8, i.e., there is no game that
models the sigma-type Σ(N,Nb), is precisely due to completeness of games.
As explained in Section 1.8, the main idea of p-games is to replace games with
complete sets of t-skeletons and then discard completeness, and even consistency,
for which we suggest the reader to observe that the second problem in modeling
sigma-types by games sketched in Section 1.8, i.e., there is no game that models
the sigma-type Σ(N, ListN), is due to consistency of games.
Next, let us review the universal identification on j-sequences. Recall first that
traditionally each game G comes together with a certain equivalence relation ≃G on
its positions, called the identification (of positions) [48, 34]. The identification ≃G
is to identify positions in G up to inessential details of ‘tags’ on moves so that the
resulting game semantics matches the abstraction degree of terms in type theories.
Nevertheless, the previous work [33] observes that the identifications given in
the literature identify positions always in the same way and shows that we may
therefore replace the identifications equipped on games with a single equivalence
relation ≃U on j-sequences, called the universal identification. By this unification
of identifications, t-skeletons do not need an identification either, which facilitates
key concepts such as p-strategies (Definition 2.25) [33].
The technical detail of the universal identification ≃U is slightly involved (see
[33] for its precise definition), but the idea is straightforward:
Definition 2.21 (Universal identification, informally [33]) The universal iden-
tification ≃U holds between positions s, t ∈ G in a game G, for which we write
s ≃U t, if s and t are the same j-sequence up to permutation of natural numbers
i ∈ N serving as ‘tags’ ( , i) on the same occurrence of exponential ! in G.
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For example, by any bijection f : N
∼
→ N that satisfies f(0) = 1, we have
q.(q, 0).(n, 0).m ≃U q.(q, 1).(n, 1).m for q.(q, 0).(n, 0).m, q.(q, 1).(n, 1).m ∈ N ⇒ N .
Finally, we henceforth focus on games and t-skeletons whose moves are standard so
that we can implement the universal identification ≃U on them. Also, for technical
convenience, we require that they are saturated with respect to ≃U , which leads to:
Definition 2.22 (Standard games and t-skeletons, informally [33]) Fix a set M
of moves, called standard moves, that allows us to accommodate all the games
and the constructions on them given in [31, 33] but also to implement the universal
identification ≃U (see [33] for concrete implementations of M and ≃U ). We write
J (M ) for the set of all j-sequences whose elements are standard moves.
A game G is standard if { s ∈ J (M ) | ∃t ∈ G. s ≃U t } ⊆ G ⊆ J (M ), and a
t-skeleton σ is standard if σ ⊆ J (M ) and (sm ≃U sm′∧sm ∈ σOdd)⇒ sm′ ∈ σ.
It is straightforward to see that standard games and standard t-skeletons are
closed under the constructions reviewed in this section; see [33] for the details.
2.3 Predicative games and predicative strategies
We are now ready to recall a central concept in the game semantics of MLTT [33]:
Definition 2.23 (Predicative games [33]) A predicative (p-) game is a
nonempty set G of standard t-skeletons, called tree (t-) skeletons on G, such
that the union PG :=
⋃
G forms a standard game that satisfies
1 (Det-j completeness) The set G is deterministic-join (det-j) com-
plete: If a consistent subset S ⊆ G is deterministic, i.e., smn, smn′ ∈
⋃
SEven
implies smn = smn′, then
⋃
S ∈ G;
2 (Downward completeness) The set G is downward complete: If stan-
dard t-skeletons σ ∈ G and σ˜ ⊆ PG satisfy σ˜ 6G σ then σ˜ ∈ G, where 6G is
the partial order on t-skeletons σ, σ˜ ⊆ PG defined by
σ 6G σ˜
df.
⇔ σ ≍ σ˜ ∧ σ ⊆ σ˜;
3 (Horizontal completeness) The setG is horizontally complete: If stan-
dard t-skeletons σ ∈ G and σ˜ ⊆ PG satisfy σ ≃G σ˜ then σ˜ ∈ G, where ≃G,
called the identification of t-skeletons on G, is the symmetric closure of
the preorder .G on standard t-skeletons σ, σ˜ ⊆ PG defined by
σ .G σ˜
df.
⇔ σ ≍ σ˜∧∀smn ∈ σEven, s˜m˜ ∈ σ˜. sm ≃G s˜m˜⇒ ∃s˜m˜n˜ ∈ σ˜. smn ≃U s˜m˜n˜.
We write σ :: G for σ ∈ G. A (valid) position in G is a prefix of a sequence
qGσs such that σ :: G and s ∈ σ, where qG is any distinguished element.
Conceptually, a play of a p-game G proceeds as follows. At the beginning, Judge
(J) asks P a question qG ‘What is your t-skeleton?,’ and P answers it by some
σ :: G; then, an ‘actual play’ between O and P in the ‘declared’ t-skeleton σ follows.
The main point of a p-game G is that G may be incomplete so that it is more
general than a game. Moreover, G may be even inconsistent so that σ :: G ranges
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over t-skeletons on different games ; P fixes a game when she answers J. In this way,
p-games solve the problems in game semantics of sigma-types (raised in Section 1.8)
and indeed model sigma-types; see the original article [33] for the details.
For the three axioms on p-games, let us briefly mention that det-j completeness is
vital for the domain-theoretic nature of p-games, downward completeness for linear
implication between p-games, and horizontal completeness for p-strategies; see [33].
Example 2.24 Given a set S, define the p-game flat(S) := { x | x ∈ S } ∪ {⊥},
where x := Pref({qOQxPA}) and ⊥ := Pref({qOQ}). Let us then call the p-games
0 := flat(∅) and N := flat(N), respectively, the empty predicative (p-) game and
the natural number predicative (p-) game. In addition, define another simple
p-game 1 := {⊤}, where ⊤ := {ǫ}, called the unit predicative (p-) game.
Some maximal positions of these p-games are depicted in the following diagram:
N 1 0
qN q1 q0
100 ⊤ ⊥
q q
100
They clearly correspond to the natural number game, the unit game and the empty
game given in Example 2.10, respectively, as the abuse of the notations indicates.
Finally, because we identify positions up to the universal identification ≃U , it
makes sense to identify t-skeletons on a p-game G up to the identification ≃G. In
fact, such an identification of equivalent t-skeletons matches the abstraction degree
of terms in type theories [34, Section 3.6]. For this point, it is technically more
convenient to take the union of all equivalent t-skeletons on G up to ≃G than the
quotient [42], which leads us to another central concept in the previous work [33]:
Definition 2.25 (Predicative strategies [33]) A predicative (p-) strategy on
a p-game G is the saturation Sat(σ) :=
⋃
{ σ′ :: G | σ ≃G σ′ } ⊆ PG, written
Sat(σ) : G, of an arbitrary t-skeleton σ :: G that satisfies validity : σ ≃G σ. Given
σ′ :: G, we write σ′ ∝ Sat(σ) and say that σ′ implements Sat(σ) if σ ≃G σ′.
Remark The original definitions of saturations and p-strategies [33] are different
from yet equivalent to the ones given above. The modification is just for brevity.
Example 2.26 The t-skeleton der
(i)
N
:= Pref({ q.(q, i).(n, i).n | n ∈ N }) :: N ⇒ N
for any i ∈ N is ad-hoc or too low-level since it chooses i for the ‘tag’ ( , i) on the
domain !N . The p-strategy Sat(der
(i)
N ) =
⋃
i∈N der
(i)
N : N ⇒ N fixes this problem.
For each p-game G, validity of a t-skeleton σ :: G ensures nonemptiness of the p-
strategy Sat(σ) : G. Because Sat(σ) = Sat(σ′) if and only if σ ≃G σ′ for all σ, σ′ :: G
[33], a p-strategy Sat(σ) : G is invariant with respect to the representative valid
t-skeleton σ :: G up to ≃G, which justify the arbitrary choice of σ in Definition 2.25.
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3 Consistency of intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory with formal
Church’s thesis
We have reviewed all the necessary preliminaries, and therefore let us now turn to
the main content of this article: consistency of MLTT with CT.
In this section, we prove the consistency by a realizability model of MLTT plus CT
as follows. We first define realizable t-skeletons and their realizers, and arbitrarily
fix a choice of canonical realizers for technical convenience in Section 3.1. Next,
we introduce a nonstandard variant of p-games, called np-games, to accommodate
winning-realizer-wise (w.r.w.) t-skeletons in Section 3.2. W.r.w. t-skeletons are t-
skeletons on modified linear implication, where O must play on the domain by a
winning, realizable t-skeleton and exhibit the canonical realizer for it at his first
move in each play. As explained in Section 1.10, w.r.w. t-skeletons implement our
idea on how to validate CT. Next, we show that a CCC LPGwrw of np-games and
winning w.r.w. t-skeletons gives rise to a CwF equipped with semantic type formers
for unit-, empty-, N-, pi-, sigma- and Id-types in Section 3.3, which establishes
a realizability model of MLTT equipped with these types. Finally, we prove that
the model of MLTT in LPGwrw (even constructively) validates CT and refutes the
empty-type, establishing consistency of MLTT with CT, in Section 3.4.
3.1 Realizable tree skeletons and canonical realizers
In this section, we define realizable t-skeletons and their realizers, which are based
on recursion theory [20] similarly to Section 5 of the classic AJM-games [48]. Also,
for technical convenience, we fix a canonical realizer for each realizable t-skeleton.
First, let us arbitrarily encode standard moves (Definition 2.22) by finite sequences
of natural numbers, which is clearly possible [33]. Next, recall that the pointer of
each j-sequence (Definition 2.4) is a finite function on natural numbers. It then
follows from these two points that there is a recursive bijection J (M )
∼
→ N [20].
Definition 3.1 (Coding of standard tree skeletons) Let us fix once and for all a
recursive bijection C : J (M )
∼
→ N and call it the coding of standard t-skeletons.
The coding C enables us to employ recursion theory for defining ‘constructive’ or
realizable t-skeletons:
Convention Let us fix once and for all an enumeration or Go¨del numbering GPRF :
N։ PRF on the set PRF of all partial recursive functions N ⇀ N.
Definition 3.2 (Realizable tree skeletons) A realizer for a t-skeleton σ ⊆ J (M )
is a natural number e ∈ N such that GPRF(e) partially decides the subset C (σ) ⊆ N,
i.e., GPRF(e)(n) = 1 if n ∈ C (σ), and GPRF(e)(n) ↑ otherwise, for all n ∈ N.
A t-skeleton is realizable if it is a subset of J (M ) and has a realizer.
Notation We write T Sr(G) (resp. T Swr(G)) for the set of all realizable (resp.
winning and realizable) t-skeletons on a p-game G, and Rr(G) (resp. Rwr(G)) for
the set of all realizers for realizable (resp. winning and realizable) t-skeletons on G.
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Moreover, we write tskG or tsk for the surjection Rr(G) ։ T Sr(G) such that
each natural number e ∈ Rr(G) realizes the t-skeleton tskG(e) ∈ T Sr(G), i.e.,
tskG(e) := { s ∈ PG | GPRF(e)(C (s)) = 1 }.
Let us then fix an arbitrary choice of a realizer for each realizable t-skeleton and
call it the canonical one:
Definition 3.3 (Canonical Go¨del numberings/realizers) Let us fix once and for
all a section GG : T Sr(G) → Rr(G) of the surjection tskG : Rr(G) ։ T Sr(G) for
each p-game G and call GG the canonical Go¨del numbering on G.
We call GG(σ) ∈ Rr(G) the canonical realizer for each realizable t-skeleton
σ ∈ T Sr(G) and define the set Rcwr(G) := {GG(σ) ∈ Rwr(G) | σ ∈ T Swr(G) }.
For technical convenience (e.g., for Definitions 3.20 and 3.22), we shall henceforth
focus on canonical realizers.
3.2 Cartesian closed categories of nonstandard predicative games and
winning-realizer-wise tree skeletons
In this section, we modify t-skeletons, called unions of pointwise linear implications
(UoPLIs), on a linear implication G ⊸ H between p-games G and H [33] into t-
skeletons on modified linear implication G _ H , where O must play by a winning,
realizable t-skeleton σ on the domain G and exhibit the canonical realizer for σ at
his first move in each play. This modification of t-skeletons on linear implication
implements our idea on how to model MLTT plus CT sketched in Section 1.10.
However, there arises a problem: P-games G are not closed under the modified
linear implication _ because it does not preserve saturation of the set PG of all
positions. Note that we cannot simply discard the saturation axiom since if we do
so then a t-skeleton σ :: G may generate a p-strategy Sat(σ) that is not even a
subset of PG, i.e., p-strategies would be no longer ‘strategies on p-games’ [33].
On the other hand, recall that McCusker [34, 31] dispenses with identification of
positions and strategies by employing much simpler exponential !ˆ without the ‘tags’
( , i) such that i ∈ N, which we call simplified exponential, and well-opened games,
for which simplified exponential !ˆ works. As confessed in [34, p. 48], however, this
simpler approach is mathematically ad-hoc, and it is why the previous work [33]
employs identifications of positions and p-strategies.
Nevertheless, the goal of the present work is to prove consistency of MLTT with
CT, and mathematical elegance of the employed method is secondly. Therefore, we
adopt, as a solution to the above problem, McCusker’s simplified exponential !ˆ and
well-opened games. Let us first recall these concepts plus thread-closed games:
Definition 3.4 (Thread-closed games [34, 31]) A game A is thread-closed if
s ↾ I ∈ A for any position s ∈ A and set I of initial occurrences in s, where
s ↾ I is the j-subsequence of s that consists of occurrences hereditarily justified [10]
by initial occurrences in I , called the thread of s with respect to I .
[10]An initial occurrence m in a j-sequence s hereditarily justifies an occurrence n in s if
a finite iteration of the pointer Js applied to n goes back to m.
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That is, a game is thread-closed if its positions are closed under taking threads.
Remark The terminology thread-closed is not used in the original articles [34, 31].
Definition 3.5 (Simplified exponential on games [34, 31]) The simplified expo-
nential on a game A is the game !ˆA := { s ∈ LArn(A) | ∀m ∈M
Init
A . s ↾ {m} ∈ A }.
We want the relation A ⊆ !ˆA for every game A since we employ !ˆ as an alternative
to exponential ! (Section 1.7). Although it does not hold for games in general, it does
for thread-closed ones; it is the point of the thread-closing constraint [34, p. 41].
As explained in [34, pp. 42-43], however, identities in the categories of games,
called derelictions, are not well-defined with respect to simplified exponential !ˆ. To
remedy this problem, we have to focus on:
Definition 3.6 (Well-opened games [34, 31]) A game A is well-opened if the
conjunction of smt ∈ A and m ∈M InitA imply s = ǫ.
In other words, a game is well-opened if its position contains at most one initial
occurrence. Note that well-opened games are trivially thread-closed. Note also that
well-opened games are not closed under (simplified) exponential, but it does not
matter for the present work as what we need is the implication ⇒, not (simplified)
exponential itself, and well-opened games are closed under implication [34, p. 43].
Because simplified exponential !ˆ dispenses with the ‘tags’ on exponential !, we no
longer need the universal identification ≃U of positions (Definition 2.21) or relevant
concepts. Let us therefore introduce modified p-games without the saturation or the
horizontal completeness axiom:
Definition 3.7 (Nonstandard predicative games) A nonstandard predicative
(np-) game is a nonempty set G of t-skeletons σ ⊆ J (M ) that satisfies det-j and
downward completenesses (Definition 2.23). It is well-opend if so is every σ ∈ G.
Example 3.8 The p-games in Example 2.24 are all well-opened np-games.
Convention We apply the notations/conventions for p-games to np-games as well.
Let us next introduce the modified linear implication _ between np-games as
announced above. Because np-games are defined in terms of t-skeletons (just like
p-games), we define the modified linear implication in terms of t-skeletons as follows.
Definition 3.9 (FoWRWLIs) A family of winning-realizer-wise linear im-
plications (FoWRWLI) between np-gamesG andH is a family Φ = (Φe)e∈Rcwr(G)
of well-opened t-skeletons Φe :: tskG(e) ⊸ tskH ◦ πΦ(e), where πΦ is a function
Rcwr(G)→ R
c
wr(H) assigned to Φ, called the realizer-map of Φ.
Given an np-game K and an FoWRWLI Ψ between H and K, the composition
of Φ and Ψ is the FoWRWLI Ψ ◦ Φ between G and K defined by
(Ψ ◦ Φ)e := ΨπΦ(e) ◦ Φe (e ∈ R
c
wr(G)) πΨ◦Φ := πΨ ◦ πΦ.
We write Fwrw(G,H) for the set of all FoWRWLIs between G and H .
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The dependency of FoWRWLIs on the indexing realizers prohibits us from taking
their unions, unlike UoPLIs [33] (n.b., t-skeletons on pi p-games in Section 1.8 are a
particular class of UoPLIs), since such a union may not be a t-skeleton. Specifically,
the union may be nondeterministic.
Thus, we instead take their disjoint unions :
Definition 3.10 (DoWRWLIs) A disjoint union of winning-realizer-wise
linear implication (DoWRWLIs) between np-games G and H is the disjoint
union φ := ⊎e∈Rcwr(G)Φe on an FoWRWLI Φ between G and H , where the ‘tags’
for the disjoint union are implemented within the formalization of standard moves.
Given an np-game K and a DoWRWLI ψ := ⊎e′∈Rcwr(H)Ψe′ between H and K,
the composition of φ and ψ is the DoWRWLI ψ ◦ φ between G and K defined by
ψ ◦ φ := ⊎e∈Rcwr(G)(Ψ ◦ Φ)e.
Lemma 3.11 (Well-defined DoWRWLIs) Let G, H and K be np-games.
1 Any DoWRWLI between G and H is a t-skeleton contained in J (M );
2 DoWRWLIs (resp. winning DoWRWLIs) are closed under composition.
Proof The first clause is trivial. For the second clause, it suffices to remark that
each DoWRWLI uniquely determines the underlying FoWRWLI.
For comparison, let us recall the original UoPLIs [33] between p-games:
Definition 3.12 (UoPLIs [33]) A family of pointwise linear implications
(FoPLI) between p-games G and H is a family Φ = (Φσ)σ::G of standard t-
skeletons Φσ that satisfies
1 ∀σ :: G. ∃τ :: H.Φσ :: σ⊸ τ ;
2 ∀σ, σ˜ :: G, smn ∈ ΦEvenσ , smn˜ ∈ Φ
Even
σ˜ . smn = smn˜.
We write F (G,H) for the set of all FoPLIs between G and H , and call the union⋃
Φ :=
⋃
σ::GΦσ the union of PLIs (UoPLI) between G and H (on Φ).
The first axiom on an FoPLI specifies the induced UoPLI in the pointwise fashion.
On the other hand, the second axiom brings UoPLIs determinacy, and moreover the
computational nature of game semantics; for instance, thanks to the second axiom,
their input-output pairs induce continuous functions [33].
Crucially, DoWRWLIs differ from UoPLIs in the following two points:
1 In each DoWRWLI O must play on the domain by a winning, realizable t-
skeleton and exhibit the canonical realizer for it by the ‘tag’ at his first move,
while in each UoPLI O may play by any t-skeleton on the domain and does
not have to exhibit anything other than ordinary O-moves during a play;
2 A play by a DoWRWLI may depend on the realizer O supplies, while it is not
the case for a play by a UoPLI due to the second axiom.
Consequently, DoWRWLIs implement our idea on how to validate CT, which is
described in Section 1.10, while UoPLIs do not.
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Convention Because the underlying FoWRWLI of each DoWRWLI is unique, we
henceforth use small Greek letters such as φ ∈ F (G,H) for FoWRWLIs and write,
e.g., ⊎φ := ⊎e∈Rcwr(G)φe for DoWRWLIs. We frequently omit the subscript ( )φ on
realizer-maps πφ and even keep the maps implicit.
Next, recall that the previous work [33] defines the linear implication G ⊸ H
between p-games G and H by G ⊸ H := {
⋃
Φ | Φ ∈ F (G,H) }. Similarly, we
define our modified linear implication between np-games by:
Definition 3.13 (Winning-realizer-wise linear implication) The winning-realizer-
wise (w.r.w.) linear implication between np-games G and H is the np-game
G _ H := {⊎φ | φ ∈ Fwrw(G,H) }.
Remark In Definition 3.10, ‘tags’ for DoWRWLIs are given by standard moves,
and so we may apply realizability of t-skeletons to DoWRWLIs. However, because
the set of all total recursive functions N→ N is not even recursively enumerable [20,
Theorem 7.2.9], we could not model MLTT if we focus on realizable DoWRWLIs.
Hence, we instead impose weakened realizability, called realizer-wise-realizability,
on DoWRWLIs and based on it validate CT constructively in Section 3.4.
Lemma 3.14 (Well-defined winning-realizer-wise linear implication) Np-games
are closed under w.r.w. linear implication _.
Proof Similar to (and simpler than) the proof of closure of p-games under linear
implication⊸ [33].
On the other hand, p-games are not closed under w.r.w. linear implication _.
To see this point, note that the ‘tags’ for DoWRWLIs are embedded into standard
moves, and thus certain forms of standard moves determine O’s play on the domain
of a DoWRWLI. Consequently, p-games are not closed under w.r.w. linear impli-
cation since it does not preserve saturation of positions. For instance, consider the
w.r.w. linear implication !(!N _ N) _ N , where N and !N are the natural number
game and its exponential (Section 1.7) regarded as p-games. A play in it looks like
!(!N _ N) _ N
q!(!N_N)_N
⊎φ
q[e]
(q, j)[e′],[e]
((q, i), j)[e′],[e]
((n, i), j)[e′],[e]
(m, j)[e′],[e]
(q, j′)[e′],[e]
((q, i′), j′)[e′],[e]
((n′, i′), j′)[e′],[e]
(m′, j′)[e′],[e]
l[e]
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where the subscripts ( )[e] and ( )[e′] denote the ‘tags’ for the outer and the inner
occurrences of w.r.w. linear implication, respectively. Because e realizes O’s play on
the domain !N _ N , his choice i for the ‘tag’ is completely determined by e, which
constitutes the moves in the diagram. It follows from this observation that the set
P!(!N_N)_N is not saturated (because i does not range over all natural numbers
unless we change e), showing that !(!N _ N) _ N is not a p-game. We circumvent
this problem by discarding identifications of positions and the axioms of saturation
and horizontal completeness on p-games, and then adopting np-games.
Let us proceed to define other constructions on np-games.
Definition 3.15 (Product on nonstandard predicative games) The product of
np-games G and H is the np-game G&H := {〈σ, τ〉 | σ ::, τ :: H }.
Definition 3.16 (Simplified exponential on nonstandard predicative games) The
simplified exponential of an np-game G is the np-game !ˆG := { !ˆσ | σ :: G }.
Remark The previous work [33] necessitates the countably infinite tensor on t-
skeletons (σi)i∈N for exponential ! on p-games in order to systematically accommo-
date non-innocent t-skeletons on exponentials. Note that each innocent t-skeleton
on an exponential !G is the promotion σ† of some σ :: G, and so we can dispense
with the countably infinite tensor and define !G := { σ†(= !σ) | σ :: G } if we focus
on innocent t-skeletons. In contrast, we use simplified exponential !ˆ on np-games
exclusively on the domain of w.r.w. linear implication, on which O must play by
innocent t-skeletons; thus, it suffices to define simplified exponential as given above.
Definition 3.17 (Winning-realizer-wise implication) The winning-realizer-
wise (w.r.w.) implication between np-games G and H is the np-game !ˆG _ H .
Recall once again that McCusker [34, 31] has to focus on well-opened games for
simplified exponential on games. For the same reason, we shall henceforth focus on
well-opened np-games, which the following theorem supports.
Theorem 3.18 (Well-defined constructions on nonstandard predicative games)
Well-opened np-games (resp. np-games) are closed under product & and w.r.w. im-
plication !ˆ( ) _ ( ).
Proof Closure of well-opened np-games (resp. np-games) under product is obvious,
and that under implication follows immediately from Lemma 3.14.
At this point, we can sketch how we shall validate CT as follows. Consider the
p-game !ˆ(ˆ!N _ N) _ N , which interprets the type (N⇒ N)⇒ N. We then define
a t-skeleton ⊎ctl : !ˆ(ˆ!N _ N) _ N that plays as in the following diagram:
!ˆ(ˆ!N _ N)
⊎ctl
_ N
qˆ!(ˆ!N_N)_N
⊎ctl
q[e]
(e‡)[e]
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where the subscript ( )[e] (e ∈ N) is the ‘tag’ for the outer occurrence of w.r.w.
linear implication. I.e., O makes the first move q[e] on the p-game !ˆ(ˆ!N _ N) _ N ,
where he must specify the canonical realizer e ∈ Rcwr(ˆ!(ˆ!N _ N)) for his intended
play on the domain !ˆ(ˆ!N _ N), which must be by a winning, realizable t-skeleton
on !ˆ(ˆ!N _ N), and then the t-skeleton ⊎ctl directs P to ‘copy-cats’ the realizer e
as the P-move (e‡)[e] such that tskˆ!N_N (e
‡)† = tskˆ!(ˆ!N_N)(e) holds (n.b., thus, e
and e‡ encode essentially the same computation). In this way, the t-skeleton ⊎ctl
models the nontrivial part of CT (2), which is the main idea of the present work.
Let us emphasize the point that the t-skeleton ⊎ctl resolves the dilemma between
intensionality and extensionality explained in Section 1.6. In fact, O must exhibit
the canonical realizer for his winning, realizable t-skeleton on the domain on the
nose at his first move against ⊎ctl, which is very intensional as in realizability a` la
Kleene, while ⊎ctl itself is just as abstract as morphisms in the game semantics [33]
or realizability a` la assemblies, i.e., extensional enough to model MLTT.
The rest of this article is dedicated to verifying this solution in detail. Towards
this end, let us first modify constructions on t-skeletons on linear implications [33]
into appropriate ones on w.r.w. linear implications:
Definition 3.19 (Winning-realizer-wise copy-cats) The winning-realizer-wise
(w.r.w.) copy-cat on an np-game G is the DoWRWLI ⊎cpG :: G _ G whose
component (cpG)e for each e ∈ R
c
wr(G) is given by
(cpG)e := { s ∈ tskG(e)[0] ⊸ tskG(e)[1] | ∀t  s. Even(t)⇒ t ↾ tskG(e)[0] = t ↾ tskG(e)[1] }.
Definition 3.20 (Winning-realizer-wise derelictions) The winning-realizer-
wise (w.r.w.) dereliction on an np-game G is the DoWRWLI ⊎derG : !ˆG _ G
whose component (derG)e for each e ∈ Rcwr(ˆ!G) is given by
(derG)e := { s ∈ tskˆ!G(e)⊸ tskG◦π(e) | ∀t  s. Even(t)⇒ t ↾ tskˆ!G(e) = t ↾ tskG◦π(e) },
where the realizer-map π : Rcwr(ˆ!G)→ R
c
wr(G) maps e to the canonical realizer π(e)
for the unique t-skeleton σ(e) :: G such that σ(e)† = tskˆ!G(e).
Lemma 3.21 (Well-defined winning-realizer-wise copy-cats and derelictions) Let
G be an np-game.
1 The w.r.w. copy-cat ⊎cpG is a valid, winning, realizable t-skeleton on the np-
game G _ G, and it is the unit for composition ◦ on DoWRWLIs;
2 The w.r.w. dereliction ⊎derG is a valid, winning, realizable t-skeleton on the
np-game !ˆG _ G if G is well-opened.
Proof Similar to the case of copy-cats and derelictions given in [33].
Definition 3.22 (Constructions on DoWRWLIs) Given DoWRWLIs ⊎φ :: A _
B, ⊎ψ :: B _ C, ⊎θ :: C _ D, ⊎ρ :: A _ C and ⊎ϕ :: !ˆA _ B, we define
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• The tensor ⊎φ⊗ ⊎θ := ⊎(φ⊗ θ) :: A⊗ C _ B ⊗D of ⊎φ and ⊎θ by
(φ⊗ θ)e := φe↾A ⊗ θe↾C
πφ⊗θ(e) := GB⊗D(tskB ◦ πφ(e ↾ A)⊗ tskD ◦ πψ(e ↾ C)) ∈ R
c
wr(B ⊗D)
for each e ∈ Rcwr(A⊗B), where
e ↾ A := GA(tskA⊗C(e) ↾ A) ∈ R
c
wr(A);
e ↾ C := GC(tskA⊗C(e) ↾ C) ∈ R
c
wr(C);
• The pairing 〈⊎φ,⊎ρ〉 := ⊎〈φ, ρ〉 :: A _ B & C of ⊎φ and ⊎ρ by
〈φ, ρ〉e′ := 〈φe′ , ρe′〉
π〈φ,ρ〉(e
′) := GB&C(〈tskB ◦ πφ(e
′), tskC ◦ πρ(e
′)〉) ∈ Rcwr(B & C)
for each e′ ∈ Rcwr(A);
• The promotion (⊎ϕ)† := ⊎(ϕ†) :: !ˆA _ !ˆB of ⊎ϕ by
(ϕ†)e′′ := (ϕe′′ )
† πϕ†(e
′′) := G!ˆB((tskB ◦ πϕ(e
′′))†) ∈ Rcwr(ˆ!B)
for each e′′ ∈ Rcwr(ˆ!A), where the definition allows us to write ⊎ϕ
† for (⊎ϕ)†.
Remark We fix canonical realizers (Definition 3.3) since they enable us to concisely
define these constructions in such a way that Lemma 3.24 given below holds.
Lemma 3.23 (Well-defined constructions on DoWRWLIs) DoWRWLIs (resp.
winning DoWRWLIs) are closed under tensor ⊗, pairing 〈 , 〉 and promotion ( )†.
Proof Similar to the corresponding constructions on UoPLIs [33].
Lemma 3.24 (Promotion lemma on winning-realizer-wise derelictions) Let ⊎φ ::
!ˆA _ B, ⊎ψ :: !ˆB _ C and ⊎ϕ :: !ˆC _ D be DoWRWLIs.
1 ⊎der†A = ⊎cpˆ!A and ⊎derB ◦ ⊎φ
† = ⊎φ;
2 ⊎ϕ ◦ (⊎ψ ◦ ⊎φ†)† = (⊎ϕ ◦ ⊎ψ†) ◦ ⊎φ† :: !ˆA _ D.
Proof Similar to the case of derelictions in [33].
We are now ready to define:
Definition 3.25 (Categories of realizability a` la game semantics) The category
PGwrw consists of
• Well-opened np-games as objects;
• T-skeletons on the w.r.w. implication !ˆA _ B as morphisms A→ B;
• The composition ⊎ψ•⊎φ : A→ C of morphisms ⊎φ : A→ B and ⊎ψ : B → C
given by ⊎ψ • ⊎φ := ⊎ψ ◦ ⊎φ†;
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• W.r.w. derelictions ⊎derA : !ˆA _ A as identities A→ A.
The lluf subcategory LPGwrw of PGwrw consists winning t-skeletons in PGwrw.
Notation Given an np-game G, we write PGwrw(G) and LPGwrw(G) for the hom-
sets PGwrw(1, G) and LPGwrw(1, G), respectively.
We restrict t-skeletons to winning ones in the category LPGwrw so that our game
semantics in LPGwrw would not inhabit the empty-type 0 (n.b., it suffices for t-
skeletons to be total for this aim, but totality is not preserved under composition
[27, 45]; thus, we have to strengthen totality to winning [33]). Of course, we could
further impose well-bracketing on t-skeletons [33], but for simplicity we do not.
Proposition 3.26 (Cartesian closure) The categories PGwrw and LPGwrw are
cartesian closed, where a terminal object, products and exponential objects are given
by the unit np-game 1, product & and w.r.w. implication !ˆ( ) _ ( ), respectively.
Proof Straightforward.
Similarly to existing game semantics of simple type theories and game semantics
of MLTT, the w.r.w. implications !ˆ(A & B) _ C and !ˆA _ (ˆ!B _ C) coincide up
to ‘tags’ on moves for any np-games A, B and C, and therefore currying is trivially
modeled in the categories PGwrw and LPGwrw. In particular, it explains essentially
why our model of MLTT in LPGwrw validates the ξ-rule as we shall see shortly.
3.3 Realizability model of intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory plus formal Church’s
thesis a` la game semantics
In this section, we lift the CCC LPGwrw to a category with families (CwF) [49],
an abstract model of MLTT, equipped with semantic type formers [18] for unit-,
empty-, N-, pi-, sigma- and Id-types so that LPGwrw is shown to model MLTT
together with these types by soundness of the semantics of MLTT in CwFs [18].
Towards this end, let us first enrich the CCC by algebraic CPOs [50] and based
on the enrichment introduce a game-semantic counterpart of (dependent) types:
Proposition 3.27 (CPO-enrichment) The CCC LPGwrw is CPO-enriched with
respect to the partial order 6G between t-skeletons on each np-game G defined by
σ 6G σ
′ :⇔ σ ≍ σ′ ∧ σ ⊆ σ′
for all σ, σ′ :: G, and the CPOs of np-games are algebraic whose compact elements
are t-skeletons κ :: G such that the set ⌈κ⌉ of all its P-views is finite.
Proof As outlined in [34, pp. 46-47], where the constraint σ ≍ σ′ plays a key role.
Definition 3.28 (Dependent nonstandard predicative games) A dependent
nonstandard predicative (np-) game on a well-opened np-game Γ is a continu-
ous map A from the CPO LPGwrw(Γ) = (LPGwrw(Γ),6Γ) to the flat CPO on the set
ob(LPGwrw) of all well-opened np-games such that the union
⋃
⊎γ∈LPGwrw(Γ)
⊢A(⊎γ)
is well-founded. We write DLPGwrw(Γ) for the set of all dependent np-games on Γ.
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Convention We often represent a dependent np-game A on a well-opened np-game
Γ as a family A = (A(⊎γ))⊎γ∈LPGwrw(Γ) of well-opened np-games A(⊎γ).
Every dependent np-game A is required to be continuous similarly to the domain-
theoretic interpretation of (partial) MLTT [51]. The continuity is conceptually nat-
ural particularly if we think of universes though we do not interpret them in this
article. On the other hand, at least its monotonicity is necessary for Theorem 3.35.
Unlike the game semantics of types given in [33], the indexing t-skeletons of a
dependent np-game A on a well-opened np-game Γ are on Γ, not the (simplified)
exponential !ˆΓ, because the indexing t-skeletons of DoWRWLIs are all innocent,
and so we may assume that the indexing t-skeletons on !ˆΓ are all promotions.
Let us then generalize w.r.w. implication in such a way that it captures type
dependency of pi-types:
Definition 3.29 (Integration on dependent nonstandard predicative games) The
integration of a dependent np-game A on a well-opened np-game Γ is the np-game
∫
Γ
A := DetJ(
⋃
⊎γ∈LPGwrw(Γ)
A(⊎γ)),
where DetJ(A) := {
⋃
S | S ⊆ A,S is consistent and deterministic } ⊇ A for a
given set A of t-skeletons.
Lemma 3.30 (Well-defined integration) Given a dependent np-game A on a well-
opened np-game Γ, the integration
∫
ΓA is a well-opened np-game.
Proof Let us just remark that
∫
ΓA is det-j complete by the operation DetJ.
Definition 3.31 (FoDWRWLIs) A family of dependently winning-realizer-
wise linear implication (FoDWRWLI) from a well-opened np-game Γ to a
dependent np-game A on Γ is an FoWRWLI φ from Γ to
∫
ΓA that satisfies
∀e ∈ Rcwr(Γ). πφ(e) :: A(⊎{tskΓ(e)
1}).
We write Fwrw(Γ, A) for the set of all FoDWRWLIs from Γ to A.
Note that the axiom on an FoDWRWLI φ from Γ to A is equivalent to
∀⊎γ ∈ LPGwrw(Γ). φπγ◦G1(⊤) ◦ γ⊤ :: ⊤⊸ A(⊎γ).
Definition 3.32 (Winning-realizer-wise linear-pi and pi) The winning-realizer-
wise (w.r.w.) linear-pi from a well-opened np-game Γ to a dependent np-game
A on Γ is the np-game
ℓΠwrw(Γ, A) := {⊎φ | φ ∈ Fwrw(Γ, A) },
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and the winning-realizer-wise (w.r.w.) pi from Γ to A is the np-game
Πwrw(Γ, A) := ℓΠwrw(ˆ!Γ, A
‡),
where A‡ ∈ DRPG(ˆ!Γ) is given by A‡(γˆ) := A(γˆ‡) for each γˆ ∈ LPGwrw(ˆ!Γ), and
γˆ‡ ∈ LPGwrw(Γ) is the unique element that satisfies γˆ = (γˆ‡)†.
Theorem 3.33 (Well-defined winning-realizer-wise linear-pi and pi) The w.r.w.
linear-pi ℓΠwrw(A,B) and the w.r.w. pi Πwrw(A,B) are well-opened np-games for
any pair of a well-opened np-game Γ and a dependent np-game A on Γ.
Proof Similar to (and simpler than) the case of linear-pi and pi given in [33].
Let us similarly define the w.r.w. variant of sigma:
Definition 3.34 (Winning-realizer-wise sigma) The winning-realizer-wise
(w.r.w.) sigma of a well-opened np-game Γ and a dependent np-game A on
Γ is the p-game
Σwrw(A,B) := {〈γ, α〉 :: Γ &
∫
Γ
A | e ∈ Rcwr(Γ)⇒ α :: A(⊎{tskΓ(e)
1}) }.
Note that the condition e ∈ Rcwr(Γ)⇒ α :: A(⊎{tskΓ(e)
1}) is equivalent to
γ ∈ T Swr(Γ)⇒ α :: A(⊎{γ
1}).
Theorem 3.35 (Well-defined winning-realizer-wise sigma) The w.r.w. sigma
Σwrw(A,B) is a well-opened np-game for any pair of a well-opened np-game Γ and
a dependent np-game A on Γ.
Definition 3.36 (Identity nonstandard predicative games) Given an np-game Γ
and t-skeletons γ, γ′ :: Γ, the identity (Id) between γ and γ′ is the np-game
IdΓ(γ, γ
′) :=


1 if γ = γ′;
0 otherwise.
Finally, let us introduce our game semantics of Id-types:
Proposition 3.37 (Well-defined Id on nonstandard predicative games) Given an
np-game Γ, the Id IdΓ(γ, γ
′) between any γ, γ′ :: Γ is a well-opened np-game.
Proof Obvious.
We are now ready to lift the CCC LPGwrw to a CwF. Let us first recall the general
definition of CwFs [49], where our presentation is based on [18]:
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Definition 3.38 (Categories with families [49, 18]) A category with families
(CwF) is a tuple C = (C,Ty,Tm, { }, T, . , p, v, 〈 , 〉 ), where
• C is a category with a terminal object T ∈ C;
• Ty assigns, to each object Γ ∈ C, a set Ty(Γ), called the set of all types in
the context Γ;
• Tm assigns, to each pair (Γ, A) of an object Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ), a
set Tm(Γ, A), called the set of all terms of type A in the context Γ;
• To each f : ∆ → Γ in C, { } assigns a map {f} : Ty(Γ) → Ty(∆), called
the substitution on types, and a family ( {f}A)A∈Ty(Γ) of maps {f}A :
Tm(Γ, A)→ Tm(∆, A{f}), called the substitutions on terms;
• . assigns, to each pair (Γ, A) of a context Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ), a
context Γ.A ∈ C, called the comprehension of A;
• p (resp. v) associates each pair (Γ, A) of a context Γ ∈ C and a type A ∈ Ty(Γ)
with a morphism p(A) : Γ.A→ Γ in C (resp. a term vA ∈ Tm(Γ.A,A{p(A)})),
called the first projection on A (resp. the second projection on A);
• 〈 , 〉 assigns, to each triple (f,A, g) of a morphism f : ∆ → Γ in C, a type
A ∈ Ty(Γ) and a term g ∈ Tm(∆, A{f}), a morphism 〈f, g〉A : ∆ → Γ.A in
C, called the extension of f by g
that satisfies
• (Ty-Id) A{idΓ} = A;
• (Ty-Comp) A{f ◦ e} = A{f}{e};
• (Tm-Id) h{idΓ}A = h;
• (Tm-Comp) h{f ◦ e}A = h{f}A{e}A{f};
• (Cons-L) p(A) ◦ 〈f, g〉A = f ;
• (Cons-R) vA{〈f, g〉A} = g;
• (Cons-Nat) 〈f, g〉A ◦ e = 〈f ◦ e, g{e}A{f}〉A;
• (Cons-Id) 〈p(A), vA〉A = idΓ.A
for any Γ,∆,Θ ∈ C, A ∈ Ty(Γ), f : ∆ → Γ, e : Θ → ∆, h ∈ Tm(Γ, A) and
g ∈ Tm(∆, A{f}).
Roughly, judgements of MLTT are interpreted in a CwF C by
⊢ Γ ctx 7→ JΓK ∈ C;
Γ ⊢ A type 7→ JAK ∈ Ty(JΓK);
Γ ⊢ a : A 7→ JaK ∈ Tm(JΓK, JAK);
⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx⇒ JΓK = J∆K ∈ C;
Γ ⊢ A = B type⇒ JAK = JBK ∈ Ty(JΓK);
Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A⇒ JaK = Ja′K ∈ Tm(JΓK, JAK),
where J K denotes the semantic map or interpretation [18]. Strictly speaking, the
first three maps define an interpretation J K of MLTT in C, while the last three
logical implications are soundness of the interpretation J K. See [18] for the details.
Let us now turn to introducing our CwF:
Definition 3.39 (CwF of realizability a` la game semantics) The CwF LPGwrw is
the tuple (LPGwrw,Ty,Tm, { },1, . , p, v, 〈 , 〉 ), where
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• The category LPGwrw is as defined in Definition 3.25, and 1 ∈ LPGwrw is the
unit np-game (Example 3.8);
• Given Γ ∈ LPGwrw and A ∈ DLPGwrw(Γ), we define Ty(Γ) := DLPGwrw(Γ)
and Tm(Γ, A) := LPGwrw(Πwrw(Γ, A));
• Given ⊎φ : ∆→ Γ in LPGwrw, we define the map {⊎φ} : Ty(Γ)→ Ty(∆) by
A{⊎φ} := (A(⊎φ • ⊎δ))⊎δ∈LPGwrw(∆) (A ∈ Ty(Γ)),
and the map {⊎φ}A : Tm(Γ, A)→ Tm(∆, A{⊎φ}) by
⊎α{⊎φ}A := ⊎α • ⊎φ (⊎α ∈ Tm(Γ, A));
• The comprehension Γ.A is given by Γ.A := Σwrw(Γ, A), the first projection
p(A) := fstΣwrw(Γ,A) : Σwrw(Γ, A) → Γ is the w.r.w. dereliction ⊎derΓ up to
‘tags,’ the second projection vA := sndΣwrw(Γ,A) : Π(Σwrw(Γ, A), A{p(A)}) is
the w.r.w. dereliction ⊎der∫
Γ
A up to ‘tags,’ and the extension 〈⊎φ,⊎α〉A :
∆→ Σwrw(Γ, A) is the pairing 〈⊎φ,⊎α〉 of ⊎φ and ⊎α.
Convention We frequently omit the subscript ( )A on { }A and 〈 , 〉A, and the
one ( )Σwrw(Γ,A) on fstΣwrw(Γ,A) and sndΣwrw(Γ,A).
Theorem 3.40 (Well-defined CwF of realizability a` la game semantics) The struc-
ture LPGwrw given in Definition 3.39 forms a well-defined CwF.
Proof We focus on substitutions on terms and extensions as other verifications are
straightforward. Let Γ,∆ ∈ LPGwrw, A ∈ DLPGwrw(Γ), ⊎φ ∈ LPGwrw(∆,Γ),
⊎α ∈ LPGwrw(Πwrw(Γ, A)) and ⊎α˜ ∈ LPGwrw(Πwrw(∆, A{⊎φ})).
By Lemma 3.11, ⊎α{⊎φ} = ⊎α • ⊎φ is a winning t-skeleton on ∆ ⇒
∫
Γ
A. Take
any ⊎δ ∈ LPGwrw(∆); for proving ⊎α{⊎φ} ∈ LPGwrw(Π(∆, A{⊎φ})), it suffices to
show (⊎α • ⊎φ) • ⊎δ :: !1 _ A{⊎φ}(⊎δ). Then, we calculate
(⊎α • ⊎φ) • ⊎δ = (⊎α ◦ ⊎φ†) ◦ ⊎δ† = ⊎α ◦ (⊎φ • ⊎δ)† :: !1 _ A‡((⊎φ • ⊎δ)†)
by Lemma 3.24, and
A‡((⊎φ • ⊎δ)†) = A(⊎φ • ⊎δ) = A{⊎φ}(⊎δ).
Hence, we have shown that ⊎α{⊎φ} ∈ Tm(∆, A{⊎φ}) in LPGwrw.
Similarly, the extension 〈⊎φ,⊎α˜〉 is a winning t-skeleton on ∆ ⇒ Γ & (
∫
ΓA) by
Lemma 3.23. Hence, for proving 〈⊎φ,⊎α˜〉 ∈ LPGwrw(∆,Σwrw(Γ, A)), it suffices to
show ⊎α˜ • ⊎δ :: !1 _ A(⊎φ • ⊎δ) since we have 〈⊎φ,⊎α˜〉 • ⊎δ = 〈⊎φ • ⊎δ,⊎α˜ • ⊎δ〉
with ⊎φ • ⊎δ winning. Then, we calculate
⊎α˜ • ⊎δ :: !1 _ A{⊎φ}(⊎δ) = !1 _ A(⊎φ • ⊎δ).
Finally, let us verify the required equations:
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• (Ty-Id) A{idΓ} = (A(⊎derΓ • ⊎δ))⊎δ∈LPGwrw(∆) = (A(⊎δ))⊎δ∈LPGwrw(!∆) = A
by Lemma 3.24;
• (Ty-Comp) Given Θ ∈ LPGwrw and ⊎ψ : Γ→ Θ in LPGwrw, we calculate
A{⊎ψ • ⊎φ} = (A((⊎ψ • ⊎φ) • ⊎δ))⊎δ∈LPGwrw(!∆)
= (A(⊎ψ • (⊎φ • ⊎δ)))⊎δ∈LPGwrw(!∆) (by Lemma 3.24)
= (A{⊎ψ}(⊎φ • ⊎δ))⊎δ∈LPGwrw(!∆)
= (A{⊎ψ}{⊎φ}(⊎δ))⊎δ∈LPGwrw(!∆)
= A{⊎ψ}{⊎φ};
• (Tm-Id) ⊎α{idΓ} = ⊎α•⊎derΓ = ⊎α◦⊎cp!ˆΓ = ⊎α by Lemmata 3.21 and 3.24;
• (Tm-Comp) ⊎α{⊎ψ•⊎φ} = ⊎α•(⊎ψ•⊎φ) = (⊎α•⊎ψ)•⊎φ = ⊎α{⊎ψ}•⊎φ =
⊎α{⊎ψ}{⊎φ} by Lemma 3.24;
• (Cons-L) p(A) • 〈⊎ψ,⊎α˜〉 = fst ◦ 〈⊎ψ,⊎α˜〉† = fst ◦ 〈⊎ψ†,⊎α˜†〉 = ⊎ψ;
• (Cons-R) vA{〈⊎ψ,⊎α˜〉} = snd ◦ 〈⊎ψ,⊎α˜〉† = snd ◦ 〈⊎ψ†,⊎α˜†〉 = ⊎α˜;
• (Cons-Nat) 〈⊎ψ,⊎α˜〉 • ⊎φ = 〈⊎ψ • ⊎φ,⊎α˜ • ⊎φ〉 = 〈⊎ψ • ⊎φ,⊎α˜{⊎φ}〉;
• (Cons-Id) 〈p(A), vA〉 = 〈fstΣwrw(Γ,A), sndΣwrw(Γ,A)〉 = ⊎derΣwrw(Γ,A) = idΓ.A,
which completes the proof.
Let us then proceed to equip the CwF LPGwrw with semantic type formers for
unit-, empty-, N-, pi-, sigma- and Id-types. We begin with pi-types (Appendix A.6).
Recall first the semantic type former for pi-types in an arbitrary CwF:
Definition 3.41 (CwFs with pi-types ([18])) A CwF C supports pi if
• (Π-Form) Given Γ ∈ C, A ∈ Ty(Γ) and B ∈ Ty(Γ.A), there is a type
Π(A,B) ∈ Ty(Γ);
• (Π-Intro) Given b ∈ Tm(Γ.A,B), there is a term λA,B(b) ∈ Tm(Γ,Π(A,B));
• (Π-Elim) Given k ∈ Tm(Γ,Π(A,B)) and a ∈ Tm(Γ, A), there is a term
AppA,B(k, a) ∈ Tm(Γ, B{a}), where a := 〈idΓ, a〉A : Γ→ Γ.A;
• (Π-Comp) AppA,B(λA,B(b), a) = b{a};
• (Π-Subst) Given ∆ ∈ C and f : ∆→ Γ in C, Π(A,B){f} = Π(A{f}, B{f+}),
where f+ := 〈f ◦ p(A{f}), vA{f}〉A : ∆.A{f} → Γ.A;
• (λ-Subst) λA,B(b){f} = λA{f},B{f+}(b{f
+}) ∈ Tm(∆,Π(A{f}, B{f+}));
• (App-Subst) AppA,B(k, a){f} = AppA{f},B{f+}(k{f}, a{f}) ∈ Tm(∆, B{a}{f}).
Furthermore, C supports pi in the strict sense if it additionally satisfies
• (λ-Uniq) λA,B ◦AppA{p(A)},B{p(A)+}(k{p(A)}, vA) = k.
Pi-types (with the η-rule) are modeled in a CwF that supports pi (in the strict
sense); see Appendix A.6 for the details.
Let us now show that the CwF LPGwrw supports pi in the strict sense:
Lemma 3.42 (Winning-realizer-wise currying lemma) Given Γ ∈ LPGwrw, A ∈
DLPGwrw(Γ) and B ∈ DLPGwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A)), there is a bijection
λA,B : LPGwrw(Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), B))
∼
→ LPGwrw(Πwrw(Γ,Πwrw(A,B))),
where Πwrw(A,B) := (Πwrw(A(⊎γ), B⊎γ))⊎γ∈LPGwrw(Γ) and B⊎γ := (B(〈⊎γ,⊎α˜〉)⊎α˜∈LPGwrw(A(⊎γ)).
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Proof It suffices to show that there is a bijection between (not necessarily winning or
realizable) t-skeletons on Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), B) and those on Πwrw(Γ,Πwrw(A,B)).
Recall first that a t-skeleton ⊎φ :: Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), B) consists of a family φ =
(φe)e∈Rcwr(!Σwrw(Γ,A)) of t-skeletons φe :: tsk(e) _ tsk(πφ(e)) together with a map
πφ : Rcwr(!Σwrw(Γ, A)) → R
c
wr(
∫
B) that satisfies tsk(πφ(e)) :: B
‡(tsk(e)!1) for all
e ∈ Rcwr(!Σwrw(Γ, A)) (Definitions 3.9, 3.10, 3.31 and 3.32). Similarly, a t-skeleton
⊎ψ :: Πwrw(Γ,Πwrw(A,B)) consists of a family ψ = (ψf )f∈Rcwr(Γ) of t-skeletons
ψf :: tsk(f) _ tsk(πψ(f)) together with a map πψ : R
c
wr(Γ)→ R
c
wr(
∫
Πwrw(A,B))
that satisfies tsk(πψ(f)) :: Πwrw(A,B)
‡(tsk(f)!1) for all f ∈ Rcwr(Γ).
Then, by applying the standard currying operation in game semantics ([31, 34]),
which simply adjust ‘tags’ on moves appropriately, to each component φe of a given
t-skeleton ⊎φ :: Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), B) and adjusting the map πφ accordingly, we
obtain a t-skeleton on Πwrw(Γ,Πwrw(A,B)). Finally, note that this operation on
t-skeletons has the evident inverse, which completes the proof.
Remark The proof of Lemma 3.42 is essentially the same as the corresponding one
given in the previous work [33], and thus it explains why our realizability a` la game
semantics validates the ξ-rule just like the existing game semantics does.
Theorem 3.43 (Realizability model of pi-types a` la game semantics) The CwF
LPGwrw supports pi in the strict sense.
Proof Let Γ ∈ LPGwrw, A ∈ DLPGwrw(Γ), B ∈ DLPGwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A)) and ⊎β ∈
LPGwrw(Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), B)).
• (Π-Form) Let us define Π(A,B) := (Πwrw(A(⊎γ), B⊎γ))⊎γ∈LPGwrw(Γ), where
B⊎γ := (B(〈⊎γ,⊎α˜〉)⊎α˜∈LPGwrw(A(⊎γ)) ∈ DLPGwrw(A(⊎γ)). To distinguish it
from the game semantics of pi-types in [33], we write Πwrw(A,B) for Π(A,B).
• (Π-Intro)We get λA,B(⊎β) ∈ LPGwrw(Πwrw(Γ,Πwrw(A,B))) by Lemma 3.42,
where recall that λA,B and λ
−1
A,B simply ‘adjust tags’ on standard moves. We
often omit the subscripts ( )A,B on λA,B and λ
−1
A,B .
• (Π-Elim)Given ⊎κ ∈ LPGwrw(Πwrw(Γ,Πwrw(A,B))) and ⊎α ∈ LPGwrw(Πwrw(Γ, A)),
we define AppA,B(⊎κ,⊎α) := λ
−1
A,B(⊎κ) • ⊎α. As shown in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.40, we have λ−1A,B(⊎κ)•⊎α : Πwrw(Γ, B{⊎α}), and so AppA,B(⊎κ,⊎α) ∈
LPGwrw(Πwrw(Γ, B{⊎α})). We often omit the subscripts A,B on AppA,B.
• (Π-Comp) AppA,B(λA,B(⊎β),⊎α) = λ
−1
A,B(λA,B(⊎β)) • ⊎α = ⊎β{⊎α}.
• (Π-Subst) Given ∆ ∈ LPGwrw and ⊎φ ∈ LPGwrw(∆,Γ), we calculate
Π(A,B){⊎φ} = (Π(A(⊎γ), B⊎γ))⊎γ∈LPGwrw(Γ){⊎φ}
= (Π(A(⊎φ • ⊎δ), B⊎φ•⊎δ))⊎δ∈LPGwrw(∆)
= (Π(A{⊎φ}(⊎δ), B{⊎φ+}⊎δ))⊎δ∈LPGwrw(∆)
= Π(A{⊎φ}, B{⊎φ+}),
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where B{⊎φ+}d = B⊎φ•⊎δ since for all ⊎αˆ ∈ LPGwrw(A(⊎φ • ⊎δ)) we have
B{⊎φ+}⊎δ(⊎αˆ) = B{⊎φ
+}(〈⊎δ,⊎αˆ〉)
= B(〈⊎φ • p(A{⊎φ}), vA{⊎φ}〉 • 〈⊎δ,⊎αˆ〉)
= B(〈⊎φ • ⊎δ,⊎αˆ〉)
= B⊎φ•⊎δ(⊎αˆ).
• (λ-Subst) We calculate
λA,B(⊎β){⊎φ} = λA,B(⊎β) • ⊎φ
= λA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}(⊎β • 〈⊎φ • fst, snd〉) (by the definition of λ)
= λA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}(⊎β • 〈⊎φ • p(A{⊎φ}), vA{⊎φ}〉)
= λA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}(⊎β{⊎φ
+}).
• (App-Subst) We calculate
AppA,B(⊎κ,⊎α){⊎φ} = (λ
−1
A,B(⊎κ) • 〈⊎derΓ,⊎α〉) • ⊎φ
= λ−1A,B(⊎κ) • (〈⊎derΓ,⊎α〉 • ⊎φ)
= λ−1A,B(⊎κ) • 〈⊎φ,⊎α • ⊎φ〉
= λ−1A,B(⊎κ) • (〈⊎φ • p(A{⊎φ}), vA{⊎φ}〉 • 〈⊎der∆,⊎α • ⊎φ〉)
= (λ−1A,B(⊎κ) • ⊎φ
+) • (⊎α • ⊎φ)
= λ−1
A{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}(⊎κ • ⊎φ) • (⊎α • ⊎φ) (by λ-Subst)
= λ−1
A{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}(⊎κ • ⊎φ){(⊎α • ⊎φ)}
= AppA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}(⊎κ • ⊎φ,⊎α • ⊎φ) (by Π-Comp)
= AppA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}(⊎κ{⊎φ},⊎α{⊎φ}).
• (λ-Uniq) Finally, we calculate
λA,B(AppA{p(A)},B{p(A)+}(⊎κ{p(A)}, vA)) = λA,B(λ
−1
A{p(A)},B{p(A)+}(⊎κ{p(A)}) • vA)
= λA,B((λ
−1
A,B(⊎κ) • p(A)
+) • vA) (by λ-Subst)
= λA,B(λ
−1
A,B(⊎κ) • (p(A)
+ • vA))
= λA,B(λ
−1
A,B(⊎κ) • ⊎derΣwrw(Γ,A))
= λA,B(λ
−1
A,B(⊎κ))
= ⊎κ,
where p(A)+ := 〈p(A)•p(A{p(A)}), vA{p(A)}〉 : Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), A{p(A)})→
Σwrw(Γ, A) and vA := 〈⊎derΣwrw(Γ,A), vA〉 : Σwrw(Γ, A)→ Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), A{p(A)}),
which completes the proof.
Next, we consider sigma-types (Appendix A.7). Again, we first recall the semantic
type former for sigma-types in an arbitrary CwF:
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Definition 3.44 (CwFs with sigma-types [18]) A CwF C supports sigma if
• (Σ-Form) Given Γ ∈ C, A ∈ Ty(Γ) and B ∈ Ty(Γ.A), there is a type
Σ(A,B) ∈ Ty(Γ);
• (Σ-Intro) There is a morphism PairA,B : Γ.A.B → Γ.Σ(A,B) in C;
• (Σ-Elim) Given P ∈ Ty(Γ.Σ(A,B)) and p ∈ Tm(Γ.A.B, P{PairA,B}), there
is a term RΣA,B,P (p) ∈ Tm(Γ.Σ(A,B), P );
• (Σ-Comp) RΣA,B,P (p){PairA,B} = p;
• (Σ-Subst) Given ∆ ∈ C and f : ∆→ Γ in C, Σ(A,B){f} = Σ(A{f}, B{f+}),
where f+ := 〈f ◦ p(A{f}), vA{f}〉A : ∆.A{f} → Γ.A;
• (Pair-Subst) p(Σ(A,B)) ◦PairA,B = p(A) ◦p(B) and f⋆ ◦PairA{f},B{f+} =
PairA,B◦f++, where f⋆ := 〈f◦p(Σ(A,B){f}), vΣ(A,B){f}〉Σ(A,B) : ∆.Σ(A,B){f} →
Γ.Σ(A,B) and f++ := 〈f+ ◦p(B{f+}), vB{f+}〉B : ∆.A{f}.B{f
+} → Γ.A.B;
• (RΣ-Subst) RΣA,B,P (p){f
⋆} = RΣ
A{f},B{f+},P{f⋆}(p{f
++}).
Moreover, C supports sigma in the strict sense if it also satisfies
• (RΣ-Uniq) If p ∈ Tm(Γ.A.B, P{PairA,B}), q ∈ Tm(Γ.Σ(A,B), P ) and
q{PairA,B} = p, then q = RΣA,B,P (p).
Sigma-types (with the η-rule) are interpreted in a CwF that supports sigma (in
the strict sense); see Appendix A.7 for the details.
Now, let us describe our interpretation of sigma-types:
Theorem 3.45 (Realizability model of sigma-types a` la game semantics) The
CwF LPGwrw supports sigma in the strict sense.
Proof Let Γ ∈ LPGwrw, A ∈ DLPGwrw(Γ) and B ∈ DLPGwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A)).
• (Σ-Form) Similarly to pi, let Σ(A,B) := (Σwrw(A(⊎γ), B⊎γ))⊎γ∈LPGwrw(Γ).
Again, to distinguish it from the game semantics of sigma-types given in the
previous work [33], we write Σwrw(A,B) for Σ(A,B).
• (Σ-Intro) By an isomorphism Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), B) ∼= Σwrw(Γ,Σwrw(A,B)),
which is similar to (and simpler than) the one in Lemma 3.42 and left to
the reader, let PairA,B : Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), B)→ Σwrw(Γ,Σwrw(A,B)) be the
evident w.r.w. dereliction up to ‘tags,’ or PairA,B := 〈fst • fst, 〈snd • fst, snd〉〉.
Note that there is the evident inverse Pair−1A,B = 〈〈fst, fst • snd〉, snd • snd〉.
• (Σ-Elim) We define RΣA,B,P (⊎ρ) ∈ LPGwrw(Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ,Σwrw(A,B)), P ))
to be ⊎ρ • Pair−1A,B for any P ∈ DLPGwrw(Σwrw(Γ,Σwrw(A,B))) and ⊎ρ ∈
LPGwrw(Π(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), B), P{PairA,B})).
• (Σ-Comp) We calculate
RΣA,B,P (⊎ρ){PairA,B} = R
Σ
A,B,P (⊎ρ) • PairA,B
= (⊎ρ • Pair−1A,B) • PairA,B
= ⊎ρ • (Pair−1A,B • PairA,B)
= ⊎ρ • ⊎derΣwrw(Σwrw(Γ,A),B)
= ⊎ρ.
• (Σ-Subst) Similar to the case of pi.
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• (Pair-Subst) We calculate
p(Σwrw(A,B)) • PairA,B = fst • 〈fst • fst, 〈snd • fst, snd〉〉
= fst • fst
= p(A) • p(B),
and
⊎ φ⋆ • PairA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}
= 〈⊎φ • p(Σwrw(A,B){⊎φ}), vΣwrw(A,B){⊎φ}〉 • PairA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}
= 〈⊎φ • p(Σwrw(A{⊎φ}, B{⊎φ
+})) • PairA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}, vΣwrw(A,B){⊎φ} • PairA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}〉
= 〈⊎φ • p(A{⊎φ}) • p(B{⊎φ+}), vΣwrw(A{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}) • PairA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}〉
(by the above equations)
= 〈⊎φ • fst • fst, snd • 〈fst • fst, 〈snd • fst, snd〉〉〉
= 〈⊎φ • fst • fst, 〈snd • fst, snd〉〉
= 〈fst • fst, 〈snd • fst, snd〉〉 • 〈〈⊎φ • fst • fst, snd • fst〉, snd〉
= 〈fst • fst, 〈snd • fst, snd〉〉 • 〈〈⊎φ • fst, snd〉 • fst, snd〉
= PairA,B • 〈〈⊎φ • p(A{⊎φ}), vA{⊎φ}〉 • p(B{⊎φ
+}), vB{⊎φ+}〉
= PairA,B • 〈⊎φ
+ • p(B{⊎φ+}), vB{⊎φ+}〉
= PairA,B • ⊎φ
++.
• (RΣ-Subst) We calculate
RΣA,B,P (⊎ρ){⊎φ
⋆} = ⊎ρ • Pair−1A,B • 〈⊎φ • p(Σwrw(A,B){⊎φ}, vΣwrw(A,B){⊎φ}〉
= ⊎ρ • 〈〈fst, fst • snd〉, snd • snd〉 • 〈⊎φ • fst, snd〉
= ⊎ρ • 〈〈⊎φ • fst, fst • snd〉, snd • snd〉
= ⊎ρ • 〈〈⊎φ • fst, snd〉 • fst, snd〉 • 〈〈fst, fst • snd〉, snd • snd〉
= ⊎ρ • 〈⊎φ+ • fst, snd〉 • 〈〈fst, fst • snd〉, snd • snd〉
= ⊎ρ • 〈⊎φ+ • p(B{⊎φ+}), vB{⊎φ+}〉 • Pair
−1
A{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+}
= RΣA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+},P{⊎φ∗}(⊎ρ • 〈⊎φ
+ • p(B{⊎φ+}), vB{⊎φ+}〉)
= RΣA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+},P{⊎φ∗}(⊎ρ{⊎φ
++}).
• (RΣ-Uniq) If a given ⊎̺ ∈ LPGwrw(Π(Σwrw(Γ,Σwrw(A,B)), P )) satisfies the
equation ⊎̺{PairA,B} = ⊎ρ then we calculate
⊎̺ = ⊎ρ • Pair−1A,B = R
Σ
A,B,P (⊎ρ),
which completes the proof.
We proceed to model N-type (Appendix A.5). Again, let us first recall the semantic
type former for N-type in an arbitrary CwF:
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Definition 3.46 (CwFs with N-type [18][11]) A CwF C supports natural num-
bers if
• (N-Form) Given Γ ∈ C, there is a type NΓ ∈ Ty(Γ), called natural number
(N-) type in Γ, which we often abbreviate as N ;
• (N-Intro) There are a term and a morphism in C
0Γ ∈ Tm(Γ, N) succΓ : Γ.N → Γ.N
that satisfy the equations
0Γ{f} = 0∆ ∈ Tm(∆, N)
p(N) ◦ succΓ = p(N) : Γ.N → Γ
succΓ ◦ 〈g, vN 〉N = 〈g, vN{succ∆}〉N : ∆.N → Γ.N
for any morphisms f : ∆→ Γ and g : ∆.N → Γ in C;
Notation Let us define zeroΓ := 〈idΓ, 0Γ〉N : Γ → Γ.N for each Γ ∈ C; it
then satisfies zeroΓ ◦ f = 〈f, 0∆〉N = 〈f, vN{zero∆}〉N : ∆ → Γ.N for any
f : ∆ → Γ in C. We often omit the subscript ( )Γ on 0Γ, zeroΓ and succΓ.
Also, for each n ∈ N, we define nΓ ∈ Tm(Γ, N) by
– 0Γ is already given;
– n+ 1Γ := vN{succΓ ◦ 〈idΓ, nΓ〉};
• (N-Elim) Given a type P ∈ Ty(Γ.N), and terms z ∈ Tm(Γ, P{zero}) and
s ∈ Tm(Γ.N.P, P{succ ◦ p(P )}), there is a term RNP (z, s) ∈ Tm(Γ.N, P );
• (N-Comp) We have the equations
RNP (z, s){zero} = z ∈ Tm(Γ, P{zero});
RNP (z, s){succ} = s{〈idΓ.N ,R
N
P (z, s)〉P } ∈ Tm(Γ.N, P{succ});
• (N-Subst) NΓ{f} = N∆ ∈ Ty(∆);
• (RN -Subst) RNP (z, s){f
+} = RNP{f+}(z{f}, s{f
++}) ∈ Tm(∆.N, P{f+}),
where
f+ := 〈f ◦ p(N), vN 〉N : ∆.N → Γ.N
f++ := 〈f+ ◦ p(P{f+}), vP{f+}〉P : ∆.N.P{f
+} → Γ.N.P.
N-type is interpreted in a CwF that supports natural numbers; see Appendix A.5
for the details.
We now propose our game semantics of N-type by basically employing the stan-
dard game semantics of PCF [31] for the total fragment:
[11]The definition is left to the reader in [18], and thus Definition 3.46 is the author’s
solution, which may be shown to be sound in the same manner as the case of pi- and
sigma-types [18]. This point is applied to empty-type given below as well.
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Theorem 3.47 (Realizability model of N-type a` la game semantics) The CwF
LPGwrw supports natural numbers.
Proof Let Γ,∆ ∈ LPGwrw and ⊎φ : ∆→ Γ in LPGwrw.
• (N-Form) NΓ is the constant dependent np-game on Γ valued at N (Exam-
ple 3.8), for which we write {N}Γ or {N}.
• (N-Intro) 0Γ ∈ Tm(Γ, {N}) is the DoWRWLI ⊎{0} :: N up to ‘tags,’ and
succΓ : Σwrw(Γ, {N[0]})→ Σwrw(Γ, {N[1]}) is the pairing 〈p({N}),⊎s
Γ〉, where
the subscripts ( )[i] (i = 0, 1) are to distinguish the two copies of N , and the
DoWRWLI ⊎sΓ :: Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N[0]}), {N[1]}) is defined by
sΓe :=


Pref({q[1].q[0].n[0].(n+ 1)[1]}) if snd • tsk(e) = n;
Pref({q[1].q[0]}) otherwise,
up to ‘tags’ for each e ∈ Rcwr(Σwrw(Γ, {N[0]})). Clearly, we have 0Γ •⊎φ = 0∆
and sΓ • 〈⊎ψ, v{N}∆〉 = s
∆ = v{N}∆{succ∆}, where ⊎ψ : Σwrw(∆, {N}∆)→ Γ
is any morphism in LPGwrw, and therefore the required equations hold.
• (N-Elim) Given P ∈ DLPGwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N})), ⊎ζ ∈ Tm(Γ, P{zero}) and
⊎σ ∈ Tm(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P ), P{succ◦p(P )}) in LPGwrw, there are terms
⊎ζ˜ ∈ Tm(Σwrw(Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P ), {Σwrw(Γ, {N})}), P{zero • fst • snd})
⊎σ˜ ∈ Tm(Σwrw(Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P ), {Σwrw(Γ, {N})}), P{succ • pred • snd})
defined respectively by
⊎ζ˜ : Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P) & Σwrw(Γ, {N})
snd
−→ Σ(Γ, {N})
fst
−→ Γ
⊎ζ
−→
∫
P{zero};
⊎σ˜ : Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P) & Σwrw(Γ, {N})
〈pred•snd,evP {〈fst,pred•snd〉}〉
−→ Σwrw(Γ, {N}) &
∫
P
⊎σ
−→
∫
P{succ ◦ fst}
where evP ∈ Tm(Σwrw(Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P ), {Σwrw(Γ, {N})}), P{snd}) is
the evaluation on P [27, 31, 34] given by evP := λ
−1(⊎derΠwrw(Σwrw(Γ,{N}),P )),
and pred : Σwrw(Γ, {N}) → Σwrw(Γ, {N}) is the predecessor [31] defined
similarly to succ such that pred•succ = ⊎derΣwrw(Γ,{N}) and pred•zero = zero.
In addition, let us define
Pz := P{zero • p(N)}) ∈ Ty(Σwrw(Γ, {N}));
Ps := P{succ • pred • p(Pz)} ∈ Ty(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), Pz))
and then we have
condP ∈ Tm(Σwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), Pz), Ps), P{p(Pz) • p(Ps)})
that is the standard interpretation of conditionals on P [48, 44, 31, 34]: It first
asks an input natural number in the component N of the domain, and plays as
the w.r.w. dereliction between Pz and P{p(Pz)•p(Ps)} if the answer is 0, and
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as the w.r.w. dereliction between Ps and P{p(Pz)•p(Ps)} otherwise. Then, we
define FNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ) : Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P )→ Πwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P ) by
FNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ) := λ{Σwrw(Γ,{N})},{P{snd}}(condP {〈〈snd,⊎ζ˜〉,⊎σ˜〉}).
Finally, we define RNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ) ∈ Tm(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P ) to be the least upper
bound of the following chain of (RNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ)n ∈ Tm(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P ))n∈N:
RNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ)0 := ⊤ (up to ‘tags’);
RNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ)n+1 := F
N
P (⊎ζ,⊎σ) • R
N
P (⊎ζ,⊎σ)n.
• (N-Comp) By the definition of RNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ), we calculate
RNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ){zero} = ⊎ζ ∈ Tm(Γ, P{zero});
RNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ){succ} = ⊎σ{〈⊎derΣ(Γ,{N}),R
N
P (⊎ζ,⊎σ)〉} ∈ Tm(Σwrw(Γ, {N}), P{succ}).
• (N-Subst) {N}Γ{⊎φ} = {N}∆.
• (RN -Subst) Finally, by the definition of RNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ), we calculate
RNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ){⊎φ
+} = RNP{⊎φ+}(⊎ζ{⊎φ},⊎σ{⊎φ
++})
(or alternatively show RNP (⊎ζ,⊎σ)n{⊎φ
+} = RNP{⊎φ+}(⊎ζ{⊎φ},⊎σ{⊎φ
++})n for
all n ∈ N by induction on n so that the above equation holds).
We proceed to model identity (Id-) types (Appendix A.8). Again, we first review
the semantic type former for Id-types in an arbitrary CwF:
Definition 3.48 (CwFs with Id-types [18]) A CwF C supports Id if
• (Id-Form) Given Γ ∈ C and A ∈ Ty(Γ), there is a type IdA ∈ Ty(Γ.A.A+),
where A+
df.
= A{p(A)} ∈ Ty(Γ.A);
• (Id-Intro) There is a morphism ReflA : Γ.A→ Γ.A.A+.IdA in C;
• (Id-Elim) Given B ∈ Ty(Γ.A.A+.IdA) and b ∈ Tm(Γ.A,B{ReflA}), there is
a term RIdA,B(b) ∈ Tm(Γ.A.A
+.IdA, B);
• (Id-Comp) RIdA,B(b){ReflA} = b;
• (Id-Subst) IdA{f++} = IdA{f} ∈ Ty(∆.A{f}.A{f}
+) for all ∆ ∈ C
and f : ∆ → Γ in C, where A{f}+
df.
= A{f}{p(A{f})} ∈ Ty(∆.A{f}),
f+
df.
= 〈f ◦ p(A{f}), vA{f}〉A : ∆.A{f} → Γ.A and f
++ df.= 〈f+ ◦
p(A+{f+}), vA+{f+}〉A+ : ∆.A{f}.A
+{f+} → Γ.A.A+;
• (Refl-Subst) ReflA ◦f+ = f+++ ◦ReflA{f} : ∆.A{f} → Γ.A.A
+.IdA, where
f+++
df.
= 〈f++ ◦ p(IdA{f++}), vIdA{f++}〉IdA : ∆.A{f}.A
+{f+}.IdA{f} →
Γ.A.A+.IdA;
• (RId-Subst) RIdA,B(b){f
+++} = RIdA{f},B{f+++}(b{f
+}).
Id-types are interpreted in a CwF that supports Id; see Appendix A.8 for the
details.
We then equip the CwF LPGwrw with our game-semantic Id-types:
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Theorem 3.49 (Realizability model of Id-types a` la game semantics) The CwF
LPGwrw supports Id.
Proof Let Γ ∈ LPGwrw and A ∈ DLPGwrw(Γ).
• (Id-Form) We define IdA ∈ DLPGwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A), A+)) by IdA
df.
=
(IdA(⊎γ)(⊎α,⊎α
′))〈〈⊎γ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉∈LPGwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ,A),A+)).
• (Id-Intro) Let ReflA : Σwrw(Γ, A[1])→ Σwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A[2]), A
+
[3]), IdA)
be what plays by the w.r.w. dereliction between Σwrw(Γ, A[1]) and Σwrw(Γ, A[2]),
between
∫
ΓA[1] and
∫
ΓA
+
[3], or as the canonical one Σwrw(Γ, A[1])→ 1, where
the subscripts ( )[i] (i = 1, 2, 3) are to distinguish the three copies of A. The
inverse Refl−1A : Σwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A[2]), A
+
[3]), IdA) → Σwrw(Γ, A[1]) which
is the w.r.w. dereliction between Σwrw(Γ, A[2]) and Σwrw(Γ, A[1]) up to ‘tags.’
Remark If we allowed a non-canonical t-skeleton on IdA then ReflA would
have only the left inverse, being unable to satisfy Id-Elim given below, which
is why we define Id np-games in the rather extensional form in Definition 3.36.
• (Id-Elim) Given B ∈ DLPGwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A[2]), A
+
[3]), IdA)) and
⊎β ∈ Tm(Σwrw(Γ, A), B{ReflA}) in RPGwrw, we define
RIdA,B(⊎β)
df.
= ⊎β •Refl−1A ∈ Tm(Σwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ, A[1]), A
+
[2]), IdA), B).
• (Id-Comp) We then calculate
RIdA,B(⊎β){ReflA} = R
Id
A,B(⊎β) • ReflA
= (⊎β • Refl−1A ) •ReflA
= ⊎β • (Refl−1A • ReflA)
= ⊎β • ⊎derΣwrw(Γ,A)
= ⊎β.
• (Id-Subst) Given ∆ ∈ RPGwrw and ⊎φ : ∆→ Γ in RPGwrw, we calculate
IdA{⊎φ
++} = (IdA(⊎γ)(⊎α,⊎α
′))〈〈⊎γ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉∈LPGwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ,A),A+)){⊎φ
++}
= (IdA(〈〈⊎γ,⊎α〉,⊎α
′〉))〈〈⊎γ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉∈LPGwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(Γ,A),A+){⊎φ
++}
= (IdA(⊎φ
++ • 〈〈⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉))〈〈⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉∈LPGwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(∆,A{⊎φ}),A{⊎φ}+))
= (IdA(〈⊎φ • ⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α
′〉))〈〈⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉∈LPGwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(∆,A{⊎φ}),A{⊎φ}+))
= (IdA(⊎φ•⊎δ)(⊎α,⊎α
′))〈〈⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉∈LPGwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(∆,A{⊎φ}),A{⊎φ}+))
= (IdA{⊎φ}(⊎δ)(⊎α,⊎α
′))〈〈⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉∈LPGwrw(Σwrw(Σwrw(∆,A{⊎φ}),A{⊎φ}+))
= IdA{⊎φ},
where the forth equation holds because
⊎φ++ • 〈〈⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉 = 〈⊎φ+ • p(A+{⊎φ+}), vA+{⊎φ+}〉 • 〈〈⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α
′〉
= 〈⊎φ+ • p(A+{⊎φ+}) • 〈〈⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉, vA+{⊎φ+} • 〈〈⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α
′〉〉
= 〈〈⊎φ • ⊎δ,⊎α〉,⊎α′〉.
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• (Refl-Subst) We calculate
ReflA • ⊎φ
+ = ReflA • 〈⊎φ • p(A{⊎φ}), vA{⊎φ}〉
= 〈〈〈⊎φ • p(A{⊎φ}), vA{⊎φ}〉 • p(A
+{⊎φ+}) • p(IdA{⊎φ
++}),
vA+{⊎φ+} • p(IdA{⊎φ
++})〉, vIdA{⊎φ++}〉 • ReflA{⊎φ} (by the definition of Refl)
= 〈〈⊎φ+ • p(A+{⊎φ+}), vA+{⊎φ+}〉 • p(IdA{⊎φ
++}), vIdA{⊎φ++}〉 • ReflA{⊎φ}
= 〈⊎φ++ • p(IdA{⊎φ
++}), vIdA{⊎φ++}〉 • ReflA{⊎φ}
= ⊎φ+++ • ReflA{⊎φ}.
• (RId-Subst) We calculate
RIdA,B(⊎β){⊎φ
+++} = (⊎β • Refl−1A ) • ⊎φ
+++
= ⊎β • (Refl−1A • ⊎φ
+++)
= ⊎β • (⊎φ+ •Refl−1A{⊎φ}) (by Refl-Subst)
= (⊎β • ⊎φ+) • Refl−1A{⊎φ}
= RIdA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+++}(⊎β • ⊎φ
+)
= RIdA{⊎φ},B{⊎φ+++}(⊎β{⊎φ
+}),
which completes the proof.
We next model unit-type (Appendix A.3). First, let us recall the semantic type
former for unit-type:
Definition 3.50 (CwFs with unit-type [18]) A CwF C supports unit if
• (Unit-Form) Given Γ ∈ C, there is a type 1Γ ∈ Ty(Γ), called the unity type
in the context Γ;
• (Unit-Intro) Given Γ ∈ C, there is a term ⊤Γ ∈ Tm(Γ,1Γ);
• (Unit-Elim) Given Γ ∈ C, A ∈ Ty(Γ.1Γ), a ∈ Tm(Γ, A{⊤Γ}) and t ∈
Tm(Γ,1Γ), there is a term R1A(a, t) ∈ Tm(Γ, A{t}), where ⊤
df.
= 〈idΓ,⊤Γ〉1Γ :
Γ→ Γ.1Γ and t
df.
= 〈idΓ, t〉1Γ : Γ→ Γ.1
Γ;
• (Unit-Comp) R1A(a,⊤Γ) = a;
• (Unit-Subst) Given f : ∆→ Γ in C, 1Γ{f} = 1∆ ∈ Ty(∆);
• (⊤-Subst) ⊤Γ{f} = ⊤∆ ∈ Tm(∆,1∆).
Moreover, C supports one in the strict sense if it additionally satisfies:
• (⊤-Uniq) t = ⊤Γ for all t ∈ Tm(Γ,1
Γ).[12]
Unit-type (with the η-rule) is interpreted in a CwF that supports unit (in the
strict sense); see Appendix A.3 for the details.
We now propose our game semantics of the unit-type:
Theorem 3.51 (Realizability model of unit-type a` la game semantics) The CwF
LPGwrw supports unit in the strict sense.
[12]Note that ⊤-Uniq implies Unit-Elim and Unit-Comp by defining R1A(a, t)
df.
= a.
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Proof Let Γ,∆ ∈ LPGwrw and ⊎φ : ∆→ Γ in LPGwrw.
• (Unit-Form) 1Γ is the constant dependent np-game valued at the unit np-
game 1 (Example 3.8), for which we write {1}Γ or {1}.
• (Unit-Intro) ⊤Γ ∈ Tm(Γ, {1}Γ) is the unique one ⊤ :: 1 up to ‘tags.’
• (Unit-Elim)Given A ∈ DLPGwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {1}Γ)), ⊎α ∈ Tm(Γ, A{〈derΓ,⊤Γ〉})
and ⊎τ ∈ Tm(Γ, {1}Γ) in LPGwrw, the equation ⊎τ = ⊤Γ clearly holds, i.e.,
⊤-Uniq is satisfied, and thus, we define R1A(⊎α,⊎τ)
df.
= ⊎α.
• (Unit-Comp) Clearly, R1A(⊎α,⊤Γ) = ⊎α.
• (Unit-Subst) Clearly, {1}Γ{f} = {1}∆.
• (⊤-Subst) Clearly, ⊤Γ • ⊎φ = ⊤∆ : ∆→ 1,
which completes the proof.
Finally, we model empty-type (Appendix A.4). First, the semantic type former for
empty-type is:
Definition 3.52 (CwFs with empty-type [18]) A CwF C supports empty if
• (Empty-Form) Given Γ ∈ C, there is a type 0Γ ∈ Ty(Γ), called the empty-
type in the context Γ;
• (Empty-Elim) Given Γ ∈ C, A ∈ Ty(Γ.0Γ) and z ∈ Tm(Γ,0Γ), there is a
term R0A(z) ∈ Tm(Γ, A{z}), where z
df.
= 〈idΓ, z〉0Γ : Γ→ Γ.0
Γ;
• (Empty-Subst) Given f : ∆→ Γ in C, 0Γ{f} = 0∆ ∈ Ty(∆);
• (R0-Subst) R0A{f+}(z{f}) = R
0
A(z){f}, where f
+ df.= 〈f • p(0∆), v0Γ〉0Γ :
∆.0∆ → Γ.0Γ.
Empty-type is interpreted in a CwF that supports empty; see Appendix A.4 for
the details.
Let us propose our game-semantic interpretation of empty-type:
Theorem 3.53 (Realizability model of empty-type a` la game semantics) The
CwF LPGwrw supports empty.
Proof Let Γ ∈ LPGwrw and ⊎φ : ∆→ Γ in LPGwrw.
• (Empty-Form) 0Γ is the constant dependent np-game valued at the empty
np-game 0 (Example 3.8), for which we write {0}Γ or {0}.
• (Empty-Elim) Let A ∈ DLPGwrw(Σwrw(Γ, {0}Γ)) and ⊎ζ ∈ Tm(Γ, {0}Γ) in
LPGwrw. We obtainR0A(⊎ζ) ∈ Tm(Γ, A{⊎ζ}) in LPGwrw by a case analysis: It
is obtained from ⊎ζ by replacing the first move of {0}Γ with those of A{⊎ζ} if
any, and ⊤ (up to ‘tags’) otherwise, where ⊎ζ
df.
= 〈idΓ,⊎ζ〉 : Γ→ Σwrw(Γ, {0}).
• (Empty-Subst) Clearly, {0}Γ{⊎φ} = {0}∆.
• (R0-Subst) By the definition of the operation R0( ), we calculate
R0A{⊎φ+}(⊎ζ{⊎φ}) = R
0
A{⊎φ+}(⊎ζ • ⊎φ)
= R0A{⊎φ+}(⊎ζ) • ⊎φ
= R0A(⊎ζ){⊎φ},
which completes the proof.
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3.4 Main result: consistency of intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory with formal
Church’s thesis
Finally, let us solve the targeted open problem, viz., consistency of MLTT with
CT, in the affirmative. For precision, let us implement the T-predicate T and the
result-extracting function U (Section 1.4) as follows. We first define a realizer for a
given partial function f : N ⇀ N to be a realizer for some t-skeleton ⊎φ :: !ˆN _ N
whose extension ext(⊎φ) : n ∈ N 7→ read◦ tskN ◦πφ ◦G!ˆN (n
†), where read(⊥) ↑ and
read(m) := m for all m ∈ N, coincides with f . Note that we may apply realizability
of t-skeletons to DoWRWLIs on !ˆN _ N since t-skeletons on N are finitary (and so
the ‘tags’ for the disjoint union on the DoWRWLIs are decidable). These realizers
define a Go¨del numbering on all partial recursive functions, where realizers for total
t-skeletons realize total recursive functions. Then, we implement the T-predicate
and the result-extracting function in MLTT with respect to these realizers:
• The T-predicate is the type x : N, y : N, z : N ⊢ T(x, y, z) type such that
T(e, n, c) = 1 if the triple e, n, c ∈ N satisfies the T-predicate relation with
respect to the realizers just defined, for which we write T (e, n, c), and
T(e, n, c) = 0 otherwise;
• The result-extracting function is the term x : N ⊢ U(x) : N such that U(c) = n : N
if c ∈ N encodes, with respect to the realizers just defined, the computational
history of a terminating computation on N whose output is n ∈ N, and
U(c) = 0 : N otherwise.
In practice, the T-predicate and the result-extracting function are given in MLTT
by the elimination rule of N-type, which is possible because they are primitive
recursive. Thus, having modeled MLTT, including N-type, one may think that game
semantics of the T-predicate and the result-extracting function has been obtained as
well. Strictly speaking, however, it is not quite the case because we need a universe
to formalize the T-predicate in that way because it is a type, not a term.
For this point, we could extend our model of MLTT to a universe, but for brevity,
let us skip interpreting a universe in this article and instead define our interpretation
of the T-predicate directly:
Definition 3.54 (Realizability model of the T-predicate a` la game semantics) We
interpret the T-predicate in the CwF LPGwrw by the dependent np-game T on the
product (N &N) &N defined by
T (〈〈⊎σ,⊎τ〉,⊎γ〉) :=


1 if T (read ◦ πσ(⊤†), read ◦ πτ (⊤†), read ◦ πγ(⊤†));
0 otherwise.
Clearly, our interpretation of the T-predicate is sound, i.e., it respects the judg-
mental equality. Hence, we have extended our model of MLTT in the CwF LPGwrw
to the T-predicate. We are now ready to present our main theorem:
Theorem 3.55 (Realizability model of MLTT plus CT a` la game semantics) The
CwF LPGwrw validates CT, and therefore it models MLTT equipped with CT.
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Proof We have given a model of MLTT equipped with the T-predicate and unit-,
empty-, N-, sigma-, pi- and Id-types in LPGwrw. Hence, it remains to validate CT
in LPGwrw. Let us write CT ∈ LPGwrw for the interpretation of CT (2) in LPGwrw.
As sketched in Section 1.10, we define the t-skeleton ⊎ct :: CT whose component
cte for each e ∈ Rcwr(ˆ!(ˆ!N _ N)) is the t-skeleton 〈e
‡, ct′〉 up to ‘tags,’ where e‡ ∈
Rcwr(ˆ!N _ N) is the canonical realizer that satisfies tskˆ!N_N (e
‡)† = tskˆ!(ˆ!N_N)(e),
and ct′ is the evident t-skeleton that essentially computes the code c ∈ N of the
computational history of the t-skeleton tskˆ!N_N (e
‡) applied to a given t-skeleton
n :: N (n ∈ N) such that T (e‡, n, c) and U(c) = tskˆ!N_N (e
‡) • n hold.
Corollary 3.56 (Consistency of MLTT with CT) MLTT is consistent with CT.
Proof The corollary follows from Theorem 3.55 because there is no total t-skeleton
on the empty np-game 0.
As already remarked (right after Definition 3.13), we cannot restrict DoWRWLIs
to realizable ones unless we give up modeling MLTT. Nevertheless, we can focus on
DoWRWLIs whose components are all realizable and model MLTT in the resulting
lluf subCwF of LPGwrw, for which we write RPGwrw. This idea leads us to:
Definition 3.57 (Winning-realizer-wise realizability) A DoWRWLI is winning-
realizer-wise (w.r.w.) realizerable if each of its components is realizable.
Corollary 3.58 (Constructive model of MLTT plus CT) The lluf subcategory
RPGwrw of the category LPGwrw whose morphisms are all w.r.w. realizable gives rise
to a CwF equipped with the semantic type formers the CwF LPGwrw has. Moreover,
the CwF RPGwrw validates CT and refutes empty-type 0.
Proof Observe that w.r.w. realizable DoWRWLIs are closed under composition ◦,
pairing 〈 , 〉 and promotion ( )†. It then follows that the lluf subcategory RPGwrw
induces a model of MLTT just like the category LPGwrw does, and the model refutes
empty-type. Finally, the t-skeleton ⊎ct :: CT is trivially w.r.w. realizable.
Because O provides P with the canonical realizer for his intended play on the
domain at the beginning of each play in a DoWRWLI, we may reasonably regard
w.r.w. realizable DoWRWLIs as ‘constructive’ ones. Hence, Corollary 3.58 improves
Theorem 3.55 by showing that there is a ‘constructive’ model of MLTT plus CT.
4 Conclusion and future work
We have proved consistency of MLTT with CT, which has been a long-standing
open problem in constructive mathematics, by a novel realizability model of MLTT
plus CT a` la game semantics. Our main technical highlight is to resolve the dilemma
between intensionality and extensionality in the consistency problem, which existing
realizability models cannot overcome, by taking advantage of some distinguishing
features of game semantics: the distinction and the asymmetry between O and P.
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Methodologically, the present work has demonstrated that game semantics is a
powerful semantic method not only for full abstraction/completeness problems but
also for the meta-theoretic study on foundations of constructive mathematics.
As future work, we plan to extend our game semantics of MLTT to homotopy type
theory (HoTT) [17] and apply the semantics to the study of HoTT similarly to the
present work. We would also like to extend the semantics to other type constructions
such as well-founded tree types [13] and induction-recursion [52].
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Appendix A: Intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory
The difference between the intensional and the extensional variants of MLTT is
that there is only equality in the form of a judgement, or judgmental equality, in the
extensional one, while the intensional one in addition has identity types for another
kind of equality, called propositional equality, which is to be witnessed by terms. See
Appendix A.8 for the details. It is easy to observe from the rules of identity types
that judgmentally equal terms are also propositionally equal, but not vice versa.
Formally, the extensional variant is the intensional one equipped with the axiom of
equality reflection, which derives judgmental equality from propositional one [11].
In this appendix, we briefly review the syntax of the intensional variant, which
we call MLTT. We first recall contexts in Section A.1 and structural rules in
Section A.2. We then recall each type construction in Sections A.3-A.8. Along
the syntax, we also recall the interpretation J K of MLTT in an arbitrary CwF
C = (C,Ty,Tm, { }, T, . , p, v, 〈 , 〉 ) [18] fixed throughout this appendix.
Each type construction in MLTT is defined in terms of formation, introduction,
elimination and computation rules. Roughly, the formation rule stipulates how
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to form the type, and the introduction rule defines terms[13] of the type. On the
other hand, the elimination and the computation rules describe how to consume the
terms and the result of the consumption (in the form of equations), respectively,
both of which are justified by the introduction rule.
A.1 Contexts
A context is a finite sequence x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An of pairs (xi,Ai) of a variable
xi and a type Ai such that the variables x1, x2, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct. We write
♦ for the empty context, i.e., the empty sequence ǫ, but we usually omit ♦ (and
sometimes even ⊢) if it appears on the LHS of the turnstile ⊢ in a judgement.
We have the following axiom and rules for contexts:
(Ctx-Emp)
⊢ ♦ ctx
Γ ⊢ A type
(Ctx-Ext)
⊢ Γ, x : A ctx
⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx Γ ⊢ A = B type
(Ctx-ExtEq)
⊢ Γ, x : A = ∆, y : B ctx
where x (resp. y) does not occur in Γ (resp. ∆).
The axiom Ctx-Emp and the rule Ctx-Ext define that contexts are exactly finite
lists of pairs of a variable and a type. On the other hand, the rule Ctx-ExtEq is
an instance of a congruence rule because it states that judgmental equality = on
contexts is preserved under ‘context extension’ given by Ctx-Ext. Note also that we
have ⊢ ♦ = ♦ ctx by Ctx-Emp and the rule Ctx-EqRefl in the next section.
Convention As in [18], we skip writing congruence rules for other constructions.
[13]Strictly speaking, the introduction rule defines canonical terms of the type, which
in turn defines terms of the type; see [12, 53, 15] on this point.
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A.2 Structural rules
Next, let us collect the rules applicable to all types as structural rules:
⊢ x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An ctx
(Var) (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n})
x1 : A1, x2 : A2, . . . , xn : An ⊢ xj : Aj
⊢ Γ ctx(Ctx-EqRefl)
⊢ Γ = Γ ctx
⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx(Ctx-EqSym)
⊢ ∆ = Γ ctx
⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx ⊢ ∆ = Θ ctx(Ctx-EqTrans)
⊢ Γ = Θ ctx
Γ ⊢ A type
(Ty-EqRefl)
Γ ⊢ A = A type
Γ ⊢ A = B type
(Ty-EqSym)
Γ ⊢ B = A type
Γ ⊢ A = B type Γ ⊢ B = C type
(Ty-EqTrans)
Γ ⊢ A = C type
Γ ⊢ a : A(Tm-EqRefl)
Γ ⊢ a = a : A
Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A(Tm-EqSym)
Γ ⊢ a′ = a : A
Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A Γ ⊢ a′ = a′′ : A(Tm-EqTrans)
Γ ⊢ a = a′′ : A
⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx Γ ⊢ A type
(Ty-Conv)
∆ ⊢ A type
Γ ⊢ a : A ⊢ Γ = ∆ ctx Γ ⊢ A = B type
(Tm-Conv)
∆ ⊢ a : B
The rule Var states the reasonable idea that we may give an element xj : Aj if it
occurs in the context just by ‘copy-catting’ it. The next nine rules stipulate that
every judgmental equality = is an equivalence relation. Finally, the rules Ty-Conv
and Tm-Conv formalize the natural phenomenon that judgements are preserved
under the exchange of judgmentally equal contexts and/or types.
It is then easy to see that the following weakening and substitution rules are
admissible in MLTT, but it is convenient to present them explicitly:
Γ,∆ ⊢ J Γ ⊢ A type
(Weak)
Γ, x : A,∆ ⊢ J
Γ, x : A,∆ ⊢ J Γ ⊢ a : A
(Subst)
Γ,∆[a/x] ⊢ J[a/x]
where x does not occur in Γ or ∆ for Weak, and not in Γ for Subst, and J[a/x] (resp.
∆[a/x]) is the capture-free substitution [54] of a for x in J[14] (resp. ∆).
Note that a priori we cannot define an interpretation of MLTT by induction on
deductions since a derivation of a judgement in MLTT is not unique in the presence
of the rules Ty-Con and Tm-Con [18]. For this point, a standard approach is to
define an interpretation J K on pre-syntax, which is partial, by induction on the
length of pre-syntax, and show that it is well-defined on every valid pre-syntax, i.e.,
judgement, and preserves judgmental equality by the semantic equality. By this
soundness theorem [18], a posteriori we may describe the interpretation J K of the
syntax by induction on derivation of judgements:
[14]Here, J denotes the RHS of the turnstile ⊢ in an arbitrary judgement.
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Definition A.1 (Interpretation of contexts and structural rules in CwFs [18]) The
interpretation J K of contexts and structural rules in a CwF C is defined by:
• (Ct-Emp) J⊢ ♦ ctxK
df.
= T ;
• (Ct-Ext) J⊢ Γ, x : A ctxK
df.
= J⊢ Γ ctxK.JΓ ⊢ A typeK;
• (Var) JΓ, x : A ⊢ x : AK
df.
= vJAK;
JΓ, x : A,∆, y : B ⊢ x : AK
df.
= JΓ, x : A,∆ ⊢ x : AK{p(JΓ, x : A,∆ ⊢ B typeK)}JAK;
• (Ty-Con) J∆ ⊢ A typeK
df.
= JΓ ⊢ A typeK;
• (Tm-Con) J∆ ⊢ a : BK
df.
= JΓ ⊢ a : AK.
In the rest of this appendix, we recall specific type constructions in MLTT and
the interpretations of them in an arbitrary CwF.
A.3 Unit-type
Let us begin with the simplest type, called unit-type (or one-type) 1, which is the
type that has just one term ⊤.[15] Thus, from the logical point of view, it represents
the simplest true formula.
Rules of unit-type are the following:
⊢ Γ ctx(1-Form)
Γ ⊢ 1 type
⊢ Γ ctx(1-Intro)
Γ ⊢ ⊤ : 1
Γ ⊢ t : 1(1-Uniq)
Γ ⊢ t = ⊤ : 1
Γ, x : 1 ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ c : C[⊤/x] Γ ⊢ t : 1
(1-Elim)
Γ ⊢ R1(C, c, t) : C[t/x]
Γ, x : 1 ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ c : C[⊤/x]
(1-Comp)
Γ ⊢ R1(C, c,⊤) = c : C[⊤/x]
Note that 1-Uniq implies 1-Elim and 1-Comp if we define R1(C, c, t)
df.
≡ c.
The formation rule 1-Form states that unit-type is atomic, i.e., we may form it
without assuming any other types. The introduction rule 1-Intro defines that it has
just one term, viz., ⊤. Then, the uniqueness rule 1-Uniq should make sense, from
which the remaining rules 1-Elim and 1-Comp follow as already mentioned.
Definition A.2 (Interpretation of unit-type in CwFs) The interpretation J K of
unit-type in a CwF C that supports unit is given by:
• (1-Form) JΓ ⊢ 1 typeK
df.
= 1JΓK;
• (1-Intro) JΓ ⊢ ⊤ : 1K
df.
= ⊤JΓK;
• (1-Elim) JΓ ⊢ R1(C, c, t) : C[t/x]K
df.
= R1JCK(JcK, JtK).
A.4 Empty-type
Next, let us recall empty-type (or zero-type) 0, which is the type that has no
terms. Thus, it corresponds in logic to the simplest false formula.
[15]Strictly speaking, 1 has just one canonical term ⊤. However, for simplicity, let us
be casual about the distinction between canonical and non-canonical terms in the
present work, and we usually call canonical/non-canonical terms just terms.
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Rules of empty-type are the following:
⊢ Γ ctx(0-Form)
Γ ⊢ 0 type
Γ, x : 0 ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ a : 0
(0-Elim)
Γ ⊢ R0(C, a) : C[a/x]
The formation rule 0-Form is similar to 1-Form, and the elimination rule 0-Elim
corresponds in logic to ex falso, i.e., ‘anything follows from a contradiction’. Empty-
type has neither introduction nor computation rule since it has no terms.
Definition A.3 (Interpretation of empty-type in CwFs) The interpretation J K of
empty-type in a CwF C that supports empty is given by:
• (0-Form) JΓ ⊢ 0 typeK
df.
= 0JΓK;
• (0-Elim) JΓ ⊢ R0(C, a) : C[a/x]K
df.
= R0JCK(JaK).
A.5 N-type
Let us proceed to recall an atomic type of computational significance, natural
number type (or N-type) N, which is a type of natural numbers.
Rules of N-type are the following:
⊢ Γ ctx
(N-Form)
Γ ⊢ N type
⊢ Γ ctx
(N-IntroZ)
Γ ⊢ zero : N
Γ ⊢ n : N
(N-IntroS)
Γ ⊢ succ(n) : N
Γ, x : N ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ cz : C[zero/x] Γ, x : N, y : C ⊢ cs : C[succ(x)/x] Γ ⊢ n : N
(N-Elim)
Γ ⊢ RN(C, cz, cs, n) : C[n/x]
Γ, x : N ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ cz : C[zero/x] Γ, x : N, y : C ⊢ cs : C[succ(x)/x]
(N-CompZ)
Γ ⊢ RN(C, cz, cs, zero) = cz : C[zero/x]
Γ, x : N ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ cz : C[zero/x] Γ, x : N, y : C ⊢ cs : C[succ(x)/x] Γ ⊢ n : N
(N-CompS)
Γ ⊢ RN(C, cz, cs, succ(n)) = cs[n/x,RN(C, cz, cs, n)/y] : C[succ(n)/x]
Again, the formation rule N-Form says that N-type is atomic. The introduction
rules N-IntroZ and N-IntroZ inductively define terms of N-type: zero (for 0 ∈ N) and
succ(n) if so is n (for n ∈ N ⇒ n+ 1 ∈ N). The elimination rule N-Elim represents
both mathematical induction and primitive recursion: To show a predicate C over N,
it suffices to prove C(zero) and C(n)⇒ C(succ(n)), or equivalently under the CHIs,
to define a (dependent) function f from N to C, it suffices to define its outputs
f(zero) on zero and f(succ(n)) on succ(n) in terms of f(n) and n. The elimination
rule makes sense by the introduction rule, i.e., for terms of N-type are only zero and
successors. The computation rules N-CompZ and N-CompS stipulate the expected
behavior of computations given by N-Elim.
Notation Given a context ⊢ Γ ctx and a natural number n ∈ N, we define the term
Γ ⊢ n : N, called the nth numeral (in the context Γ), by induction on n: 0
df.
≡ zero
and n+ 1
df.
≡ succ(n). That is, the nth numeral is to represent the number n.
Definition A.4 (Interpretation of N-type in CwFs) The interpretation J K of N-
type in a CwF C that supports N is given by:
• (N-Form) JΓ ⊢ N typeK := N JΓK;
• (N-IntroZ) JΓ ⊢ zero : NK := 0JΓK;
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• (N-IntroS) JΓ ⊢ succ(n) : NK := vN{succJΓK ◦ 〈idJΓK, JΓ ⊢ n : NK〉};
• (N-Elim) JΓ ⊢ RN(C, cz, cs, n) : C[n/x]K := RNJCK(JczK, JcsK){〈idJΓK, JnK〉N}.
It is easy to see by mathematical induction that we have JΓ ⊢ n : NK = nJΓK for
any context ⊢ Γ ctx and natural number n ∈ N.
A.6 Pi-types
Now, let us recall a dependent function types (or pi-types) construction Π. In
terms of a set-theoretic analogy, the pi-type Πx:AB(x) is something like the set of all
functions f from A to
⋃
x:A B(x) such that f(a) : B(a) for all a : A, called dependent
functions from A to B, where we informally interpret simple types A and terms a : A
as sets and elements a ∈ A of sets, respectively, and dependent types B over A as
families (B(x))x:A of sets B(x).
Rules of pi-types are the following:
Γ ⊢ A type Γ, x : A ⊢ B type
(Π-Form)
Γ ⊢ Πx:AB type
Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B
(Π-Intro)
Γ ⊢ λxA.b : Πx:AB
Γ ⊢ f : Πx:AB Γ ⊢ a : A(Π-Elim)
Γ ⊢ f(a) : B[a/x]
Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B Γ ⊢ a : A
(Π-Comp)
Γ ⊢ (λxA.b)(a) = b[a/x] : B[a/x]
Γ ⊢ f : Πx:AB(Π-Uniq)
Γ ⊢ λxA.f(x) = f : Πx:AB
where in Π-Uniq the variable x does not occur free in f.
The formation rule Π-Form states that we may form the pi-type Πx:AB from types
A and B, where B depends on A. The introduction rule Π-Intro defines how to
construct terms of Πx:AB; it is the usual currying yet generalized to dependent
types. Then, the elimination and the computation rules Π-Elim and Π-Comp make
sense by the introduction rule. Finally, the uniqueness rule Π-Uniq stipulates that
(canonical) terms of pi-types are only λ-abstractions.
Definition A.5 (Interpretation of pi-types in CwFs [18]) The interpretation J K
of pi-types in a CwF C that supports pi is given by:
• (Π-Form) JΓ ⊢ Πx:AB typeK
df.
= Π(JΓ ⊢ A typeK, JΓ, x : A ⊢ B typeK);
• (Π-Intro) JΓ ⊢ λx. b : Πx:ABK
df.
= λJAK,JBK(JΓ, x : A ⊢ b : BK);
• (Π-Elim) JΓ ⊢ f(a) : B[a/x]K
df.
= AppJAK,JBK(JΓ ⊢ f : Πx:ABK, JΓ ⊢ a : AK).
A.7 Sigma-types
Another important type construction is dependent sum types (or sigma-types)
construction Σ. In terms of the set-theoretic analogy again, the sigma-type Σx:AB(x)
represents the set of all pairs 〈a, b〉 such that a : A and b : B(a), called dependent
pairs of A and B
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Rules of sigma-types are the following:
Γ ⊢ A type Γ, x : A ⊢ B type
(Σ-Form)
Γ ⊢ Σx:AB type
Γ, x : A ⊢ B type Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ b : B[a/x]
(Σ-Intro)
Γ ⊢ 〈a, b〉 : Σx:AB
Γ, z : Σx:AB ⊢ C type Γ, x : A, y : B ⊢ g : C[〈x, y〉/z] Γ ⊢ p : Σx:AB
(Σ-Elim)
Γ ⊢ RΣ([z : Σx:AB]C, [x : A, y : B]g, p) : C[p/z]
Γ, z : Σx:AB ⊢ C type Γ, x : A, y : B ⊢ g : C[〈x, y〉/z] Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ b : B[a/x]
(Σ-Comp)
Γ ⊢ RΣ([z : Σx:AB]C, [x : A, y : B]g, 〈a, b〉) = g[a/x, b/y] : C[〈a, b〉/z]
Γ ⊢ p : Σx:AB
(Σ-Uniq)
Γ ⊢ 〈piA,B1 (p), pi
A,B
2 (p)〉 = p : Σx:AB
where
Γ ⊢ πA,B1 (p)
df.
≡ RΣ([z : Σx:AB]A, [x : A, y : B]x, p) : A
Γ ⊢ πA,B2 (p)
df.
≡ RΣ([z : Σx:AB]B[π
A,B
1 (z)/x], [x : A, y : B]y, p]) : B[π
A,B
1 (p)/x]
are projections constructed by Σ-Elim.
The formation rule Σ-Form is the same as that of pi-types. The introduction rule
Σ-Intro specifies that terms of a sigma-type Σx:AB are dependent pairs 〈a, b〉 : Σx:AB
of terms a : A and b : B[a/x]. Again, the elimination and the computation rules Σ-
Elim and Σ-Comp make sense by the introduction rule. Finally, the uniqueness rule
Σ-Uniq stipulates that (canonical) terms of sigma-types are only dependent pairs.
Definition A.6 (Interpretation of sigma-types in CwFs [18]) The interpretation
J K of sigma-types in a CwF C that supports sigma is given by:
• (Σ-Form) JΓ ⊢ Σx:AB typeK
df.
= Σ(JΓ ⊢ A typeK, JΓ, x : A ⊢ B typeK);
• (Σ-Intro) JΓ ⊢ (a, b) : Σx:ABK
df.
= PairJAK,JBK ◦ 〈JΓ ⊢ a : AK, JΓ ⊢ b : B[a/x]K〉JBK;
• (Σ-Elim) JΓ ⊢ RΣ(C, g, p) : C[p/z]K
df.
= RΣJAK,JBK,JCK(JΓ, x : A, y : B ⊢ g : C[(x, y)/z]K)◦
JΓ ⊢ p : Σx:ABK,
where the hypotheses of the rules are as presented in Sect. A.7, JΓ ⊢ a : AK
df.
=
〈id JΓK, JaK〉 : JΓK → JΓK.JAK and JΓ ⊢ p : Σx:ABK
df.
= 〈id JΓK, JpK〉 : JΓK → JΓK.JΣx:ABK.
A.8 Id-types
Note that a judgmental equality Γ ⊢ a = a′ : A is a judgement, not a formula, and
thus, it cannot be used in a context or derived by an induction principle such as
N-Elim. To overcome this deficiency, (intensional) identity types (or Id-types)
construction Id has been introduced.[16] Informally, the Id-type IdA(a, a
′) represents
the set of all (identity) proofs that ‘witnesses’ equality between a and a′.
[16]We can then, e.g., formulate and prove Peano axioms [55] via of Id-types.
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Rules of Id-types are the following:
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ a′ : A
(Id-Form)
Γ ⊢ IdA(a, a
′) type
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ a : A
(Id-Intro)
Γ ⊢ refla : IdA(a, a)
Γ, x : A, y : A, p : IdA(x, y) ⊢ C type Γ, z : A ⊢ c : C[z/x, z/y, reflz/p] Γ ⊢ q : IdA(a, a
′)
(Id-Elim)
Γ ⊢ R=(C, c, a, a′, q) : C[a/x, a′/y, q/p]
Γ, x : A, y : A, p : IdA(x, y) ⊢ C type Γ, z : A ⊢ c : C[z/x, z/y, reflz/p] Γ ⊢ a : A
(Id-Comp)
Γ ⊢ R=(C, c, a, a, refla) = c[a/z] : C[a/x, a/y, refla/p]
The formation rule Id-Form states that we may form the Id-type IdA(a, a
′) from a
type A and terms a, a′ : A. The introduction rule Id-Intro defines that there is just
one term refla of the Id-type IdA(a, a). Again, the elimination and the computation
rules Id-Elim and Id-Comp make sense by the introduction rule.
Definition A.7 (Interpretation of Id-types in CwFs [18]) The interpretation J K
of Id-types in a CwF C that supports Id is given by:
• (=-Form) JΓ ⊢ a =A a
′ typeK
df.
= IdJAK{〈JΓ ⊢ a : AK, JΓ ⊢ a
′ : AK〉JAK};
• (=-Intro) JΓ ⊢ reflA : a =A aK
df.
= vIdJAK{ReflJAK ◦ JΓ ⊢ a : AK};
• (=-Elim) JΓ ⊢ R=(C, c, a, a′, q) : C[a/x, a′/y, q/p]K
df.
= RIdJA,CK(JcK){〈〈JaK, Ja
′K〉JAK, JqK〉Ja=Aa′K}.
